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The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence has reinvigorated the role of plead-
ing in civil litigation. As a result, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
must now include more detailed allegations that demonstrate a plausible entitlement
to relief.
This article examines how these changes interact with the pleading require-
ments for patent infringement litigation. In recent years, the number of patent in-
fringement lawsuits has increased dramatically, in part because of lax notice plead-
ing requirements. This patent litigation explosion imposes exorbitant costs on
defendants and has a detrimental effect on innovation.
As courts begin to apply the new plausibility pleading regime, this article ar-
gues that they should seize the opportunity to rein in abusive patent litigation by re-
quiring particularized allegations of infringement. Adopting this regime effectuates
Twombly and Iqbal, reduces the number of nuisance-value patent infringement
suits, and begins to address the problems that cause the patent system to inhibit,
rather than promote, progress in science and the useful arts.
I. Introduction
The theory behind the patent system in the United States is simple. In ex-
change for disclosing a novel, non-obvious, and useful invention to the public, an
inventor receives the ability to exclude others from using that invention for twenty
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years.1 This "carefully crafted bargain" 2 is supposed to stimulate innovation and
"promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts. '3
The operation of the patent system, however, is anything but simple. For a
patent to issue, an application must endure a lengthy and complicated examination
process by the Patent and Trademark Office.4 If a patent is eventually obtained, it
does not guarantee its holder the right to practice the patented invention. Instead,
a patent's economic value is derived solely from the right to exclude others.6 The
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006); see also id. §§ 101-103 (stating the requirements for patentabil-
ity); Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
2 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 63; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
3 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "); see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-
6 (1966).
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the applica-
tion and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is enti-
tled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefor[e]."). See generally
Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179,
182-84 (2007) (summarizing the patent prosecution process). For a more extensive discussion of
this process, see 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.03 (2008).
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); see also Clair v. Kastar, Inc., 138 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Hand, J.) ("[I]t is scarcely necessary at this day once more to expose the fallacy that a patent
gives any right to the patentee to practice his disclosure. It merely enables him to stop others from
practising it."); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 4 (2008) ("Patents do not actually pro-
vide an affirmative right to market an invention; they provide only a right to exclude others from
doing so.").
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to
the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others .... "); see also Smith Int'l, Inc. v.
Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The grant of a patent is the grant of the
right to invoke the state's power in order to exclude others from utilizing the patentee's discovery
without his consent."); Little Mule Corp. v. Lug All Co., 254 F.2d 268, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1958)
("[I]t must be remembered that a patent is not the granting of a right to make, use, or sell. It
grants only the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the patented device."); Chi-
cago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1917) ("[A] patent con-
veys nothing but a negative right of exclusion. It is the right to exclude others, but not the natural
right to make, use, and sell, which the patentee obtains from his general ownership of the materi-
als employed, not from the government.").
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only way for a patent holder to prevent others from violating, or "infringing," a pat-
ent is to assert it in litigation.7
Patent infringement litigation, however, is out of control. Not only has the
number of filed patent infringement cases increased dramatically in recent years,
but each case requires a tremendous amount of time and money to resolve.8 High
costs, lengthy time commitments, and uncertainty combine to create incentives for
defendants to settle patent infringement cases early, even if a case is meritless. 9 As
a result, instead of incentivizing innovation, the current system encourages rent-
seeking behavior from patent holders. 10
While countless articles have outlined this problem, the proposed solutions
vary significantly. Some commentators propose structural solutions, such as creat-
ing specialized trial courts to hear patent cases." Others propose doctrinal reforms,
such as altering the Federal Circuit's approach to claim construction.' 2 Scarce at-
tention has been paid, however, to the role that changes in civil procedure could
play in mitigating the challenges of modem patent litigation in the United States.
This article will explore changes to the pleading requirements for patent in-
fringement actions. In theory, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a
minimal pleading requirement for all civil actions. 13 Indeed, the appendix of offi-
cial forms following the rules demonstrate that a patent infringement complaint
only needs to include brief conclusory allegations, such as cursory statements about
See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.").
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 See, e.g., Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance- Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal,
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 159-60 (2009).
10 See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Prop-
erty Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 509 (2003).
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent Sys-
tem Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,, Rethinking
Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007).
12 See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the
United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1; Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpre-
tation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000).
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also infra Part II.A.
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the ownership of the patent, manner of infringement, and that the patentee provided
notice to the alleged infringer. '
4
In a series of recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court revised this tradi-
tional pleading standard. 15 These decisions require plaintiffs to plead facts that
"nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible."'16 It remains
unclear how this new pleading regime will apply to patent infringement actions or
interact with the appendix of forms, which, by rule, sufficiently plead a cause of ac-
tion. 17
This article's thesis is that in light of the current patent litigation predicament,
patent infringement actions should be held to a heightened pleading requirement,
beyond that espoused by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal and approaching
the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Practically, this
change would require a patent holder to plead particularized facts to support an in-
fringement claim, such as the specific act of infringement or infringing product,
how it infringes the patent, and what claims of the patent those actions infringe.
Part I provides an overview of patent infringement litigation in the United
States and its substantial costs. Part II outlines modem pleading practice in civil
litigation, how this translates to patent cases, and how notice pleading facilitates
nuisance-value infringement claims. Finally, Part III discusses heightened pleading
and how its application in the infringement context can address the unique chal-
lenges presented by patent litigation.
II. The Current Patent Litigation Predicament
A. What is Patent Infringement?
Patents give their holders the right to exclude others for a twenty-year pe-
riod. 18 The rights bestowed by a patent are defined by a patent's "claims"-
14 See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18.
15 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Accord Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (quoting and applying this lan-
guage from Twombly).
17 See FED. R. Crv. P. 84.
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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densely worded single sentences at the end of the patent document. 19 These rights
can be infringed in two ways: directly and indirectly.
An alleged infringer is directly liable for infringement when, during the pat-
ent's term, the patented invention is made, used, offered to be sold, or sold without
authority in the United States. 20  Direct liability also arises under the doctrine of
equivalents. According to this doctrine, if a product or process does not literally
infringe the patent, the alleged infringer will nonetheless be liable "if there is
'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or process and the
claimed elements of the patented invention.,
21
Individuals can also be subject to indirect, or secondary, liability for the in-
fringement of others. Secondary infringement occurs when someone induces in-
fringement of a patent,22 which requires that "an alleged infringer knowingly in-
duce[] another to commit an infringing act.",23  In the case of process patents,
See id. § 112; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
608.01(m) (7th rev. ed. 2008) (requiring claims to be in a single sentence); Christopher A. Co-
tropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 49, 53-54 (2005).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (noting that "[t]he making, using, or selling of a patented invention is the usual meaning of
the expression 'direct infringement'); Tex. Instrnments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805
F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Literal infringement requires that the accused device embody
every element of the claim as properly interpreted.").
21 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); see also Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002) ("The doctrine of equivalents
allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the
original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes."). For a thorough dis-
cussion of the doctrine of equivalents, including its historical roots and development over time,
see generally 5 CHISUM, supra note 4, § 18.02.
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C.
DAVis L. REV. 225 (2005) (outlining inducement law).
23 E.g., Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also
PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that
"a person who provides a service that assists another in committing patent infringement may be
subject to liability under section 271 (b) for active inducement of infringement"); Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("In order to succeed on a
claim of inducement, the patentee must show, first that there has been direct infringement... and
second that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another's infringement." (citations omitted)).
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liability can arise from contributing to the infringement of a patent.24 Both of these
forms of secondary liability require proof of direct infringement by others.2 5
The primary method of holding an infringer accountable, and enforcing a pat-
entee's rights, is through litigation. 26 The patent system is designed to deter in-
fringement by ensuring that infringers have a lot to lose-they can be subject to po-
tentially broad remedies including treble damages, 27 injunctive relief,28 and
attorney's fees.29 Patentees are encouraged to file suit soon after they become
aware of infringing activity because failure to bring a timely action can often pre-
clude enforcement of the patent altogether.30 These characteristics ensure that the
patent system is self-regulating.
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 932 (2005) ("The doctrine was devised to identify instances in which it may be presumed
from distribution of an article in commerce that the distributor intended the article to be used to in-
fringe another's patent, and so may justly be held liable for that infringement.").
25 See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) ("But it is estab-
lished that there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a direct in-
fringement."); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1024 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, 9 (2005) [hereinafter Bes-
sen & Meurer, Lessons] (noting that "the patent premium flows from patent litigation, or, more
typically, the threat of litigation").
27 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("Thus, the Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation. The economic rewards during
the period of exclusivity are the carrot. The patent owner expends resources in expectation of re-
ceiving this reward. Upon grant of the patent, the only limitation on the size of the carrot should
be the dictates of the marketplace. Section 284 attempts to ensure this result by deterring infring-
ers and recouping market value lost when deterrence fails.").
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."); see also eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (outlining the equitable principles a court should
consider when determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate).
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (allowing "reasonable" attorney fees "in exceptional cases").
30 See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032-34 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (en banc) (discussing the application of the equitable doctrine of laches to patent infringe-
ment actions); State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) ("To successfully invoke laches, a defendant must prove that the plaintiff delayed filing
suit an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time after the plaintiff knew or reasonably should
have known of its claim against the defendant and that the delay resulted in material prejudice to
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B. The Costs of Patent Infringement Litigation
In recent years, there has been a marked influx in the number of patents is-
sued by the Patent and Trademark Office.3 1 In 2008 alone, 182,556 patents were
issued.32 These patents were issued from the almost five hundred thousand patent
applications that were filed in 2008-the most applications ever filed with the PTO
in a year.33 Both the number of patent applications and patents issued is signifi-
cantly higher than at any time in the history of the U.S. patent system.
34
In light of the increase in the number of issued patents, it should come as no
surprise that the number of patent infringement actions filed to enforce these rights
has also dramatically increased.35 For example, the probability that a patent will be
involved in litigation within four years of its issuance is surging-more than double
the defendant."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, no re-
covery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the
complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action."). For background on this doctrine, see
generally Eric W. Guttag, Laches and Estoppel: The Patentee Who Procrastinates in Filing Suit
May Be Lost, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 47 (2003).
31 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 68 (noting that "over the last two decades the num-
ber of patent rights has proliferated dramatically"); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19 ("More than 2.5 million United States patents have been issued in the
last twenty years.").
32 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2009, at 112 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/
2009annualreport.pdf. According to preliminary data from the PTO, an even higher number of
patents (190,121) were issued in fiscal year 2009. Id.
3 See id.; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY: CALENDAR YEARS
1790 TO THE PRESENT (2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
h_counts.pdf (providing historical data on the number of patent applications filed with the PTO).
The number of patent applications has tripled since 1980. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at
69.
34 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REv. 863, 864
(2007) (noting the "unprecedented proliferation of patents" in recent years).
35 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 26 (2009) ("The flood of patents has been accompanied by a flood of patent lawsuits.");
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 13-16 (2004)
(discussing the "patent litigation explosion"); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent
Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Dis-
putes, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 237, 250 (2006) ("For most of the past twenty years, the number of
patent suits grew at a rapid rate that largely paralleled the growth in the total number of patents.");
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 56 (2004).
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what it was in 1984.36 Overall, since the 1980s, patent litigation has undergone
steady and unparalleled growth.37
More specifically, according to recent data from the Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts, from September 2008 to September 2009, almost 3,000 patent in-
fringement suits were filed.38 At the end of this period, almost 3,500 suits re-
mained pending. 39 The number of suits filed represents a four percent decrease
from 2008, but is less than the thirteen percent drop in intellectual property suits
generally.40
This growing body of cases is different from other civil actions. Most rele-
vant for purposes of this article are the unique costs associated with patent litiga-
tion. Specifically, these costs come in three varieties: legal costs, innovation costs,
and business costs.
1. Legal Costs
Patent litigation is expensive. According to the American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association, the legal costs of a patent infringement action range from
$600,000 to $5 million, depending on the patentee's potential recovery. 4 1 In light
of these significant legal costs, it is no surprise that one survey found that litigation
costs are the number one concern for a company faced with a patent infringement
suit.
42
36 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 129 & fig.6.3.
37 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 127; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 35, at 46 (noting
the "very rapid growth in patent litigation over the past [two] decades, during which the number of
patent suits increased almost [ten]-fold"); Gauri Prakash-Canjels, Trends in Patent Cases: 1990-
2000, 41 IDEA 283, 284 (2001) (showing that from 1991 to 2000, the total number of filed patent
infringement cases increased by 111%).
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 146 tbl.C-2A (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ANNUAL REPORT]. Specifically,
2,792 patent cases were filed during this period. Id.
Id. at 200 tbl.C-1 1.
40 Id. at 146 tbl.C-2A.
41 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25 (2007).
42 See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P., FOURTH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY FINDINGS 45
(2007), available at http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/2007/FJ6438-LitTrends-vl 3.pdf.
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Several factors contribute to these high legal fees. First, patent cases are ex-
tremely complex.43 They involve two layers of complexity: highly technical legal
doctrines and procedures, plus the application of these substantive principles to
complex technologies. 4 For example, as part of every infringement suit, a court
must interpret the scope of a patent's claims. 45 This hearing, called a Markman
hearing, typically occurs prior to trial, and requires a judge to analyze the patent it-
self and the underlying technology to define what specific words or phrases in the
patent's claims mean. 46 Such underlying complexity, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, is pervasive throughout patent litigation. 7
An additional factor driving up litigation costs is the length of time it takes to
resolve patent cases.48 Pretrial discovery and motions practice frequently take
43 See, e.g., Hon. S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? A Question of Democratic
Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 796-97 (2003) (noting "the obscurities and peculiarities of
patent law and the complexities of new technology"); Benjamin Hershkowitz & Michael Schiffer,
Are Patent Cases Too Complex?, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., July 2006, at 3 (noting that "patent
law is generally acknowledged as one of the more complex bodies of law").
44 See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE xxix (Lexis
2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/patent01.pdf/$file/patent0l.pdf
("Patent cases feature complex and dynamic technological facts to a degree rarely encountered in
most other areas of litigation."); Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 289, 290 (2009) ("Nowhere is this dialogue more challenging than at the intersection where
law and science interact in the form of patents. When the subject of the case is wrapped in com-
plex and unfamiliar terms, it is tremendously difficult for legal actors to grapple with the theoreti-
cal content of the dispute.").
45 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that "the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province
of the court"). Because judges construe claims, claim construction is reviewed on appeal without
deference using a de novo standard. See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
46 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv.
101, 101-02 (2005); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 336-37 (2007).
See, e.g., Hershkowitz & Schiffer, supra note 43, at 3 ("Patent cases... involve particularly com-
plex issues of law and procedure."). In fact, Justice Scalia, during oral argument in a case discuss-
ing one of the criteria for patentability, non-obviousness, described the doctrine as "gobbledy-
gook." Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(No. 04-1350), available at 2006 WL 3422210.
4 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 131-32 (discussing how legal costs increase as liti-
gation progresses). Because of the costs associated with patent litigation, a significant number of
these cases settle quickly. See infra Part I.C; see also Kesan & Ball, supra note 35, at 272 (stating
that "the vast majority of [patent infringement] cases settle").
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months, if not years, to complete. 49 Discovery drags out, in part because the highly
confidential proprietary information typically requested in infringement cases gen-
erates highly contentious relations between the parties, often resulting in numerous
discovery-related motions. 50 The volume of discovery also contributes to these de-
lays, as patent cases usually necessitate at least ten depositions and well over a
hundred document requests reaching into the entirety of a party's business. 51 As a
result, discovery and pretrial proceedings alone entail substantial legal fees.52
Of the infringement cases that go to trial, in one-third of them, the trial occurs
over three years from the date that the plaintiff filed the complaint. 53 Twelve per-
cent take over five years to reach trial.54  Further, at the end of September 2009,
almost 400 patent cases had been pending for three years or more.55 Overall, this
complexity and duration makes defending against patent infringement litigation an
expensive endeavor.
2. Innovation Costs
Patent infringement suits have additional costs beyond the legal fees that an
alleged infringer must incur to defend them. First, when faced with an infringe-
ment claim, inventors may choose to alter their research or products to simply
49 See, e.g., Holderman & Guren, supra note 12, at 10; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 109 ("Be-
cause of this pre-trial process, it is not unusual for months or even years to pass between the filing
of a complaint and a decision at the district court level.").
50 See MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-2.
51 See MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-3 to 4-5.
52 See, e.g., MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-3 (noting that document production alone "can rap-
idly escalate into the millions of dollars"); Holderman & Guren, supra note 12, at 10 ("[P]reparing
and briefing a motion for summary judgment in a patent case in the district court could cost the
parties hundreds of thousands of dollars."); Kesan & Ball, supra note 35, at 310 (stating that
"much of the expense associated with patent litigation occurs long before the parties appear before
a jury").
53 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF
NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 15 (2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf. There are "significant variations"
among districts. Id. at 17. For example, the Eastern District of Virginia's median time-to-trial
was only 0.88 years from 1995 to 2008. Id. By contrast, the District of Connecticut has a median
time-to-trial of 4.66 years. Id. at 18. These figures include both bench and jury trials. Id. at 15.
54 See id. at 15.
55 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 58 tbl.S-11.
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avoid the scope of the asserted patent.56 If inventors cannot easily design around a
patent that has been asserted against them, the threat of a lengthy lawsuit may be
enough to cause them to cease research or the manufacture of a product or technol-
ogy entirely.
57
Further, if an infringement suit is filed, the disruption may force a company to
put research on hold until the litigation has been resolved, delaying potentially im-
portant development. 58 Litigation costs may also eat up resources that could have
gone to research and development. 59 For these reasons, an infringement suit has
the potential to negatively effect innovation generally. 60 These innovation costs are
significant in light of the patent system's purpose of incentivizing innovation.
6 1
3. Business Costs
Patent infringement suits also impose a variety of business costs on an alleged
infringer. Initially, like any lawsuit, patent litigation disrupts a business's opera-
tions. 62 Employees will be called to give depositions, personnel will need to be al-
located to gather and provide documents, and time will have to be set aside to dis-
56 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1517
(2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance]; Nard, supra note 12, at 40.
5 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 76 (noting that "[e]ven the threat of being forced to defend
against patent infringement will, in many cases, compel companies to . . . abandon particular
products"); Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 34, at 873; Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries
and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1828-
29 (2007); Nard, supra note 12, at 40 (noting that inventors will decide to avoid research when
"the risks associated with improvement activity are too great"). As one commentator noted, how-
ever, "this is an unusual reaction." Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 56, at 1517.
58 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 133 (discussing an example of how infringement
litigation delayed research and development at a start-up microprocessor firm).
59 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 14. Further, nuisance-value settlements for a license to use the
patented technology require an alleged infringer to pay money that could have gone toward re-
search and development. Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A
Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
407,438 (2007).
60 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 141-42.
61 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 141-42; see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
62 E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 132.
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cuss the matter with an attorney.63 Unlike other types of litigation, however, the
expansive nature of discovery in patent cases exacerbates these disruptive effects.64
The financial costs of patent litigation have additional consequences for an al-
leged infringer. A pending infringement suit may affect a company's ability to ob-
tain credit or, at a minimum, increase its credit costs. 65 Investors may be hesitant to
purchase a particular product or a company's stock if an infringement suit threatens
to either shut the company down or prevent it from using a specific process or
product. 66 For example, empirical data shows that the stock market negatively re-
acts to the announcement of a patent infringement suit.67 Even if the alleged in-
fringement pertains only to a component, if the overall product is a technology that
requires significant investment, customers will be wary of making that investment
because of the pending suit.68 Thus, a company faces a variety of costs when con-
fronted with allegations of patent infringement.69
C. Resulting Behavioral Effects
The significant costs associated with patent infringement litigation have sev-
eral real-world effects on the behavior of both patentees and alleged infringers.
Because of these costs, an alleged infringer has an incentive to quickly settle an in-
fringement claim, typically by purchasing a license to use the patented technology,
63 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 14 (noting the "substantial indirect costs associated
with patent litigation," including the costs of extensive document production and making employ-
ees available for "time-consuming depositions"); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO.
L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (noting that litigation costs for patent cases do not take into account "other
costs in lost employee productivity and uncertainty"); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 56,
at 1502 (noting the "indirect social costs" of patent litigation, "such as ... the value of the time
lost by corporate employees involved in the case").
64 See MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-2 to 4-4.
65 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 132.
66 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 133.
67 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 133-37; see also Harkins, supra note 59, at 444 (noting that a
company "may lower its stock prices if it takes a chance on trial instead of an early settlement").
68 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 133; Harkins, supra note 59, at 437.
69 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 140.
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rather than take the case to trial. 70  For patentees, these costs create incentives to
engage in rent-seeking behavior.71
Specifically, high litigation costs create incentives for patentees to file nui-
sance-value infringement claims.7 2  In recent years, nuisance-value patent suits
have become a "daily fact of life for most corporate legal departments. 73 In fact,
the increasing prevalence of these suits has led to some commentators describing
them as the newest form of the "slip and fall," 74 an "innovation tax, 75 and as "the
business model of the new millennium., 76 When faced with these suits, companies
often quickly settle, even if meritorious defenses exist.77 As a result, patentees be-
gin to more aggressively assert their patents, and this cycle becomes self-
78perpetuating.
One highly publicized group of patentees that engage in such rent-seeking be-
havior is the so-called "patent troll.",79 The definition of this group varies tremen-
70 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 929-30 (2007); Kesan & Ball, supra note 35, at 280; Lanjouw & Schankerman,
supra note 35, at 56 ("About 95 percent of all patent suits are settled by the parties before the end
of trial, and most of those before the trial begins..."); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note
56, at 1517-18; Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163 (2006); Sudarshan, su-
pra note 9, at 159-60.
71 See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 10, at 509.
72 See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 59, at 437; Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 172 ("Perhaps the greatest
factor contributing to the existence of nuisance-value patent suits is the high cost of patent litiga-
tion.").
73 Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 160.
74 Sheri Qualters, More Firms Fight Nuisance Patent Claims, BOSTON Bus. J., June 6, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.bizjournals.comiboston/stories/2003/06/09/story3.html.
75 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 16.
76 Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to Do), 48
B.C. L. REv. 149, 155 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things].
77 See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 59, at 437; Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 160.
78 See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 70, at 928-31; Debra Koker, Fulfilling the "Due Care " Requirement
After Knorr-Bremse, 11 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 154, 158-59 n.50 (2005); Sudarshan, supra note
9, at 171-72.
79 See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1810 (noting that "patent troll" is "a derogatory term for
firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture technology");
Rantanen, supra note 70, at 165 (noting that the group of rent-seeking patentees "encompasses,
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dously.80 Generally, however, the term refers to companies or individuals, usually
non-practicing entities, who use a patent to extract rents from producers in a given
field.8' This rent-seeking behavior is enabled, in part, by the proliferation of pat-
ents with dubious validity.82
Regardless of how a patentee who brings a nuisance-value suit is described,
several factors provide incentives for an alleged infringer to quickly settle. First, an
alleged infringer has a lot on the line-the remedies available for patent infringe-
ment are substantial and far-reaching.83 If a patentee prevails, defendants can be
subject to high damage awards or even an injunction shutting down their busi-
ness. 84  An injunction, in particular, has a high "negotiation value" because it
would require an alleged infringer to stop selling and producing the infringing
product immediately. 85 As one commentary noted, these potential remedies "en-
courage[] patent owners to roll the dice of litigation in hopes of reaping a large re-
ward." 8
6
If a "patent thicket" exists, a single product may give rise to several potential
suits that could subject a company to these severe consequences.87 Additionally,
but is not limited to, what are typically described as 'patent trolls,' 'non-practicing entities,' or
'patent enforcement and holding companies').
80 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 159 ("'Patent trolls' are one of those great rhetorical
confections that, unfortunately, mean different things to different people."); Rantanen, supra note
70, at 163-64. See generally Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7
SEDONA CONF. J. 159 (2006).
81 E.g., Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, THE RECORDER (San Fran.), July 30, 2001, at 1.
82 See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, Lessons, supra note 26, at 16 ("Opportunistic suits rely on weak pat-
ents to induce licensing."); Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll,
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL., Fall 2005, at 1, 3-4.
83 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 28-29; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 110-15
(discussing how the Federal Circuit has vastly expanded the remedies available for patent in-
fringement); Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1814-15; see also supra notes 27-29 and accompany-
ing text.
8 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing for treble damages in patent infringement cases in certain
circumstances); id. § 283 (providing for injunctive relief); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 110-
11; Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 76, at 153-54.
85 Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 76, at 153-54.
86 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 28-29.
87 Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 34, at 871-72. "A patent thicket occurs when a technology or
a product is covered by multiple patents that are often held by numerous patentees." Id. at 869.
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once a company has developed and marketed a successful product, it has consider-
able sunk costs invested in that particular technology. 88 Thus, when faced with in-
fringement suits, it makes more economic sense for that company to pay a royalty
to patentees rather than investing in different technology.
8 9
Besides these potential consequences, the significant costs associated with in-
fringement actions are another key factor that incentivizes early settlement. 90 No-
tably, a patentee and an alleged infringer do not share these costs equally-the al-
leged infringer bears a much heavier burden. 91 Initially, patentees have the ability
to retain counsel on a contingency fee basis. 92 This minimizes a patentee's risk in
filing suit and facilitates the growth of nuisance-value claims.
93
One area in which this disparity is particularly pronounced is the cost of dis-
covery. Like all lawsuits, broad discovery requests in patent cases are burdensome
in terms of production costs and business disruption. 94 In nuisance-value infringe-
ment suits, however, if the patentee is a troll or other non-practicing entity, these
burdens will not be reciprocal because the patentee will have few, if any, docu-
88 See Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 76, at 154 (noting the holdup problems created by "irreversi-
ble investments by defendants in the industry"); Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1814-15.
89 E.g., Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1814-15.
90 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 68; Kesan & Ball, supra note 35, at 280; Sudarshan,
supra note 9, at 160.
91 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 152 (discussing how alleged infringers bear a dispro-
portionate share of the legal costs in patent infringement litigation).
92 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 152 (noting that contingency fees allow plaintiffs to bring
infringement claims with "no cost"); Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 166.
93 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 152; see Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 166 (noting that "contin-
gency fee arrangements are critical to the success of nuisance plaintiffs").
94 See Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 173; see also MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 4-2 ("Thus, patent
litigation discovery tends to be broad and demanding, touches highly sensitive information, and is
extremely expensive."); R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent
Cases: An Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6
(2008) ("Corporate defendants routinely spend hundreds of thousands of dollars collecting and
analyzing documents just to respond to document requests in the beginning of a [patent infringe-
ment] case.").
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ments in existence or business to disrupt. 95 Therefore, an alleged infringer nor-
mally bears a disproportionate share of discovery costs.
9 6
More significantly, however, a typical defense to infringement is invalidity.97
To establish this defense, an alleged infringer must incur substantial costs, as it re-
quires exhaustive prior art searches and significant analysis. 98 Further, a defendant
has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption that an issued patent is
valid. 99
Another contributing factor is that non-practicing entities, such as patent
trolls, are immune from many of the defensive litigation strategies that a defendant
typically employs.100 For example, one typical defense, a counterclaim for in-
fringement of a patent owned by the defendant, is unavailable when the patentee is
not producing anything.101 Many companies assemble vast patent portfolios to de-
ter business competitors from filing patent infringement claims, since, if a suit is
95 E.g., Harkins, supra note 59, at 443 ("Discovery burdens are unequal and mostly one-sided in fa-
vor of the patent troll who commonly has few documents beyond the patent and prosecution his-
tory."); Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 174.
96 E.g., Harkins, supra note 59, at 443-44; Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 173 (stating that "the onus of
discovery production, with regard to infringement, is largely on the defendant in nuisance suits").
97 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Paul H. Heller & Michael A. Gollin, Discovery in Patent Cases, in 5
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING & LITIGATION § 70.01 (Matthew Bender 2009) (stating that
invalidity is a commonly asserted defense to a patent infringement action); Lemley, Rational Ig-
norance, supra note 56, at 1502 ("Virtually every patent infringement lawsuit includes a claim
that the patent is either invalid or unenforceable due to inequitable conduct (or commonly
both).").
98 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 152 (noting that proving invalidity requires significant cost
and effort); Kesan & Ball, supra note 35, at 277 (stating that "obtaining a pre-trial ruling-
particularly pertaining to invalidity-can be very expensive"); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra
note 56, at 1502 (noting that, when establishing invalidity during patent litigation, "lawyers and
technical experts will spend hundreds and perhaps even thousands of hours searching for and
reading prior art, poring over the specification and prosecution history, and preparing ... invalid-
ity arguments").
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
100 Harkins, supra note 59, at 442-44; M. Craig Tyler, Patent Pirates Search for Texas Treasure,
TEX. LAW., Sept. 20, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.wsgr.com/news/PDFs/
09202004_patentpirates.pdf (stating that "the patent pirate is impervious to two of the most re-
lied-upon defensive litigation tactics").
o1 See Harkins, supra note 59, at 442-43; Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 167 ("Nuisance plaintiffs,
however, who almost always exist solely for the purpose of enforcing a patent portfolio, have no
ongoing business operations which subject them to the risk of a countersuit.").
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filed, the business could then counterclaim for infringement of one of the patents in
its portfolio.10 2 As a result, disputes are often resolved through cross-licensing
agreements rather than litigation. 103 With trolls or non-practicing entities, however,
this deterrent function is ineffective, since the patentee is not producing any prod-
ucts that could infringe any patents in the defendant's patent portfolio. 104
The significant amount of uncertainty surrounding patent litigation also en-
courages early settlement. 10 5  One key area of uncertainty is with regard to the
scope of a patent's claims. 0 6 Because it is difficult to determine this scope when
the case is initially filed, an alleged infringer cannot reliably predict the probability
of success, and is therefore unwilling to risk going to trial. 107 Additionally, even if
an alleged infringer prevails at trial, the patentee can appeal to the Federal Circuit,
which has a well-documented reversal rate, particularly on the issue of claim con-
struction.10 8  Thus, this uncertainty, combined with the other factors mentioned,
102 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 34-
36 (2005) (describing how vast patent portfolios avoid costly litigation, improve bargaining posi-
tion, and improve defensive positioning by increasing the likelihood of a successful counterclaim
for infringement of a patent in the portfolio).
103 See, e.g., John R. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Port-
folios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 854-55 (2002); Harkins, supra note 59, at 443; Magliocca, supra
note 57, at 1816-17.
104 See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 59, at 442-43; Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1817; Chan & Fawcett,
supra note 82, at 4 ("A company's own patent portfolio, a shield or bargaining chip in a traditional
IP dispute, has little value when dealing with a patent troll. And because patent trolls do not make
or sell products the target company has no basis for filing a countersuit, and thus has no leverage
to create an incentive for a cross-license or any other business resolution.").
105 E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 15; Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1830. According to one
patent litigator, "You're never really more than 80 percent sure you're going to win." Qualters,
supra note 74.
106 E.g., Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 175-76 ("Interpretation of the scope of patent claims is a notori-
ously indeterminate process. Accordingly, whether or not a defendant's products actually infringe
a patent cannot be known with certainty until litigation is underway.").
107 E.g., Magliocca, supra note 57, at 1829-30.
108 See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time
is Ripe for A Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 207 (2001)
(finding a reversal rate of 40% for claim construction); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1142 (2001)
("[A] litigant whose case only involved an infringement issue had a 34% chance that the Federal
Circuit would reverse the case on the basis of erroneous claim constructions."); Kimberly A.
Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 8 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 231, 236-39 (2005) (finding a reversal rate of 40.8% when summary affirmances were
[VOL. 18:451
Particularizing Patent Pleading
creates incentives for patentees to file nuisance-value infringement suits and for al-
leged infringers to quickly settle them.
II. Pleading Patent Infringement
A. Pleading Practice Generally
Every civil action begins with the filing of a complaint. 109 Over time, schol-
ars have debated the level of detail that all pleadings," including a complaint,
should include."' These pleading requirements vary based on the court system in
which the action is taking place.
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
were required to follow the civil procedure of the state in which they were lo-
cated. 112 At that time, most states followed a system of pleading modeled after the
code pleading statute of New York."! 3 New York adopted this statute, known as
excluded and 34.5% if summary affirmances are included); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne study shows
that the plenary standard of review has produced reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all
claim constructions since Markman I . . .In fact, this reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the
worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater certainty.").
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
110 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "pleading" as "[a] formal document
in which a party to a legal proceeding (esp. a civil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to allegations,
claims, denials, or defenses. In federal civil procedure, the main pleadings are the plaintiff's com-
plaint and the defendant's answer"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (listing the pleadings available in a
civil action).
111 For a discussion of the historical debates over pleading practice, see generally Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
112 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (stating that "the practice, pleadings, and
forms and modes of proceeding.., in the circuit and district courts of the United States shall con-
form, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding existing at
the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district
courts are held"); see also Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1889) (discussing how
this statute requires that "whatever belongs to the three categories of practice, pleading, and forms
and modes of proceeding, must conform to the state law and the practice of the state courts, except
where Congress itself has legislated upon a particular subject"); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426,
441 (1875) (stating that the purpose of this Act was "to bring about uniformity in the law of pro-
cedure in the Federal and State courts of the same locality" and that the Act "had its origin in the
code-enactments of many of the States").
113 See, e.g., CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA
AND ENGLAND § 84 (1897) ("If the legislation thus begun had gone no further, the result would
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the Field Code, in 1848,114 which acted as "a kind of catalytic agent for procedural
reform elsewhere in the United States."'"15 Under this code, a complaint needed to
include "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended." ' 16 As a result, the code pre-
vented parties from pleading legal conclusions or evidence in a complaint." 7 In-
stead, a plaintiff was required to plead the "ultimate facts" that demonstrated that a
cause of action existed. "8
One example of how this pleading system operated is Gillispie v. Goodyear
Service Stores. "19 In Gillispie, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, "'without
cause or just excuse and maliciously,' trespassed upon premises occupied by her as
still have been among the great events in the history of modem law. But the really significant
thing here is that the enactment of this New York code opened, as it were, the floodgates of re-
formatory legislation, and determined the course of its progress."); Charles E. Clark, History, Sys-
tems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 533 (1925) (stating that the Field Code
"served as the model of all succeeding codes in this country").
114 See Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. For a discussion of the history leading
up to the adoption of the Field Code, see generally Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronol-
ogy of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
115 Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 293 (3d ed. 2005).
116 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, § 120, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521.
117 See, e.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1218 (3d ed. 2008) ("In the parlance fashionable during that era, the facts that were to be pleaded
were the 'ultimate facts'; the inclusion of 'evidence' and 'conclusions of law' was improper." (in-
ternal footnote omitted)); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Puzzling Persistence] (noting that, under
code pleading, "the pleading was insufficient if limited to conclusions and improper if packed
with evidence").
118 See, e.g., 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1218 ("The codes required the pleader to set
forth the facts underlying and demonstrating the existence of his cause of action."); David M.
Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 395 (1980)
("Only ultimate facts satisfied the pleading standard; evidentiary facts and conclusions within a
pleading could not state a claim.").
119 Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1963). Although this case was decided
after the federal rules were adopted, North Carolina still used a code pleading system, and this
case has been cited as the classic example of code pleading. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 513-14 (rev. 9th ed. 2005); Martin B. Louis, Inter-
cepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary
Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1023, 1025 & n.22 (1989).
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a residence, assaulted her[,] and caused her to be seized and confined as a pris-
oner." 120 According to the court, these statements were mere "legal conclusions"
and not adequately supported by facts. 121 Specifically, the court stated that these
allegations "do not disclose what occurred, when it occurred, where it occurred,
who did what, the relationships between defendants and plaintiff or of defendants
inter se, or any other factual data that might identify the occasion or describe the
circumstances of the alleged wrongful conduct of defendants." 122 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failing to state suffi-
cient facts to establish a cause of action. 1
2 3
As this example illustrates, code pleading was problematic. Enforcing the
distinction between facts and legal conclusions opened the door for unresolvable
disputes. 124 Judicial decisions were inconsistent-what one judge viewed as plead-
ing facts constituted pleading legal conclusions to others. 125 As a result, cases were
increasingly resolved based on pleading decisions rather than the merits of a
126
case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 as a response to
the pitfalls of code pleading. 127 The drafters intended to abolish code pleading in
120 Gillispie, 128 S.E.2d at 765-66.
121 Id. at 766.
122 Id. (emphasis omitted).
123 Id.
124 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Revival of Fact Pleading]; see Christopher
M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 555 (2002).
125 See Fairman, supra note 124, at 555; Roberts, supra note 118, at 395-96 ("This [code pleading]
scheme placed considerable emphasis on hypertechnical artifices of pleading and produced incon-
sistent interpretations of the adequacy of a complaint's allegations."). One scholar of the period
attempted to explain this distinction by stating that "to give the facts a legal coloring and aspect, to
present them in their legal bearing upon the issues, rather than in their actual naked simplicity, is
so far forth an averment of law instead of fact." JON NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES:
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 423, at 640 (Walter Carrington ed., rev.
5th ed. 1929).
126 See, e.g., 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1218 (stating that the codes resulted in a "multi-
tude of pleading decisions"); Marcus, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 117, at 1753 (noting that,
under code pleading, "pleading decisions continued to multiply").
127 E.g., Roberts, supra note 118, at 396. For a complete discussion of the historical background of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally Subrin, supra note 111.
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the federal system and provide a new standard for the level of detail needed in a
complaint. 128 The "keystone" of this new pleading system was Rule 8.129 Specifi-
cally, Rule 8(a)(2) states that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 130 Additionally, the rules
contain an appendix of forms that illustrate sufficient pleadings under the rules.' 
31
As Charles Clark, one of the drafters of the Federal Rules stated, these forms were
"probably the most important part of the rules," because "when you can't define
you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning.'
' 32
Overall, the federal rules adopted a "notice pleading" standard. 133 The goal
of the framers was that pleadings would merely put a party on notice and that facts,
as well as the specifics of claims, would be fleshed out through the discovery proc-
ess.134 Instead of parties fighting over procedural technicalities, once discovery oc-
curred, meritless claims could be disposed of through summary judgment.' 35
128 See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common Law-
Codes-Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REv. 899, 918-19 (1961); Roberts, supra note 118, at 396.
129 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1202 ("Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); see Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at
Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998) (describing Rule 8 as "the jewel in the crown of the Fed-
eral Rules").
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
131 FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
132 Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYo. L.J. 177, 181 (1958).
133 E.g., 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1202.
134 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) ("Such simplified 'notice pleading' is
made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures estab-
lished by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define
more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."), abrogated by Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) ("The new rules, however, restrict
the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with
a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a
device . . . to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascer-
taining the facts ... relative to those issues."); see also 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power
Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
135 E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) ("This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts
and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) ("[F]ederal courts and litigants must
rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner
rather than later.").
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The classic example of notice pleading in action is Dioguardi v. Durning.136
The plaintiff brought suit against the Collector of Customs at the Port of New York
because he held the plaintiff's "tonics" from Italy for a year and then sold them at a
public auction because of unpaid fees. 137 The plaintiff filed an "obviously home
drawn" complaint alleging "that his 'medical extracts' were given to the Springdale
Distilling Company 'with my betting (bidding?) price of $110: and not their price
of $120,"' and "'that three weeks before the sale, two cases, of [nineteen] bottles
each case, disappeared."' 138 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for
failing "to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." 1
39
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Charles Clark, reversed.' 40 The
court concluded that "however inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has
disclosed his claims that the collector has converted or otherwise done away with
two of his cases of medicinal tonics and has sold the rest in a manner incompatible
with the public auction he had announced."' 141 As a result, the court concluded that
the plaintiff should not be deprived of his day in court and that dismissal of the
complaint was inappropriate. 142
Notice pleading has several potential benefits. First, unlike the code pleading
regime, it allows courts to resolve cases on the merits rather than relying upon pro-
cedural technicalities.1'3 In theory, notice pleading also minimizes complexity.' 4
136 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J.).
131 Id. at 774.
138 Id. at 774-75. The court also noted the "plaintiffs limited ability to write and speak English." Id.
at 775.
9 Id. at 774.
140 Id. at 776.
141 Dioguardi v. Duming, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
142 id.
143 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 319 (1938) ("[I]n the
case of a real dispute, there is no substitute anywhere for a trial. To attempt to make the pleadings
serve as such substitute is in very truth to make technical forms the mistress and not the handmaid
of justice."); Hon. H. Church Ford, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Pleadings, Motions, Par-
ties, and Pre-trial Procedure, I F.R.D. 315, 318 (1940) ("The philosophy which the rules seek to
inculcate seems to be that the ends ofjustice may be attained more surely and more expeditiously
by directing principal attention to the realities and by giving less consideration to mere formali-
ties."); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome
and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the mer-
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This rationale focuses on an individual's access to justice and the court system as a
method of obtaining relief for wrongs. 145
If a party fails to satisfy these pleading requirements, it can result in the dis-
missal of the cause of action for "failure to state a claim." 146 Alternatively, a party
has the ability to move the court for "a more definite statement of a pleading...
which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a re-
sponse." 147 In line with the goals of notice pleading, however, the Supreme Court
historically interpreted Rule 8 as imposing only a minimal burden on plaintiffs.
148
For example, in Conley v. Gibson, the Court stated the "accepted rule that a com-
plaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." 149 The Court later explicitly rejected heightened pleading in
any area other than those specifically enumerated in the rules. 1
50
its."), abrogated by Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Marcus, Puzzling Persis-
tence, supra note 117, at 1749 (noting that under the federal rules, "[p]leading decisions, so
prominent at common law and under the codes, were to wither and die except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances").
144 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 462 (1943) ("There is little doubt
that the great success of the rules has been due to this combination of simplicity of general re-
quirements, requiring little time and attention in their application, with the special devices for
speedy disposition of those cases which are easily adjudicated."). As one commentary notes, "it
has been said that 'a sixteen year old boy could plead' under these rules." 5 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 117, § 1202, at 94.
145 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of
Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litiga-
tion on the merits of a claim."); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("The
basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials, not through summary
dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion. These rules were designed in large part to get
away from some of the old procedural booby traps which common-law pleaders could set to pre-
vent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court."); Fairman, supra note 124, at
557.
146 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
147 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
148 See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 437-39 (2008).
149 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
150 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 requires a plaintiff to plead claims of fraud or mis-
take "with particularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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In 2007, this jurisprudence took a distinct turn with the Court's decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 151 In Twombly, an antitrust case, the court con-
cluded that the "no set of facts" language from Conley had "after puzzling the pro-
fession for [fifty] years... earned its retirement."' 152 In its place, the Court adopted
a standard requiring a plaintiff to plead "a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." 
153
The Twombly decision created uncertainty among circuit courts, which split
over how broadly to read the decision. 54 One source of this confusion was that
shortly after Twombly was decided, another Supreme Court decision reversed the
dismissal of a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, without mentioning
"plausibility pleading."' 155 As a result, some courts read Twombly narrowly, confin-
ing the new "plausibility" standard solely to the antitrust context. 16 The majority
of courts, however, viewed Twombly more broadly and applied the new pleading
standard to other contexts. '
57
151 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
152 Id. at 563; see also Boroffv. Alza Corp., - F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 395211, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 27, 2010) (noting that "the Supreme Court has consigned the Conley standard to the dustbin
of history").
3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Thus, plaintiffs must "nudge[] their claims across the line from con-
ceivable to plausible." Id.
154 See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the new standard
announced in Twombly is "less than pellucid"); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
234 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the Twombly opinion is "confusing" and concluding that "[t]he is-
sues raised by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for
years to come"); Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) ("In the wake
of Twombly, courts and commentators have been grappling with the decision's meaning and
reach."); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ("Considerable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy
of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in [Twombly].").
155 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-95 (2007) (per curiam).
156 See, e.g., Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
("We conclude that Twombly leaves the long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading intact.");
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Court's
opinion "does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley").
157 See, e.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bouling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.43 (11 th Cir. 2008) ("We
understand Twombly as a further articulation of the standard by which to evaluate the sufficiency
of all claims brought pursuant to Rule 8(a)."); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 ("[W]e decline at this
point to read Twombly so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust context.");
2010]
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Twombly two years later in Ashcroft
v. Jqbal. 158 In Iqbal, a Pakistani national filed suit against several federal officials
for allegedly subjecting him to unconstitutionally harsh conditions of confinement
because of his race, religion, or national origin following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.159
The Court began its analysis by noting that Rule 8 "demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."'1 60 Accordingly, "[a]
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
duct alleged."1 6 1 This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the re-
viewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."'1 62 Further,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that Twombly applied only in the limited
context of antitrust disputes, stating that "Twombly expounded the pleading stan-
dard for 'all civil actions."'' 163 Thus, following Iqbal, civil litigation shifted to a
plausibility pleading paradigm.
B. Pleading in Patent Infringement Actions
A patent infringement suit is merely a specific type of civil action. 164 Ac-
cordingly, courts have traditionally applied the general notice pleading standard to
see also Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing Twombly as "fast be-
coming the citation du jour in Rule 12(b)(6) cases"); Mary J. Hackett & Patricia E. Antezana, All
But Two Circuits Interpret Twombly Broadly, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 2008, at S3.
158 Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
' Id. at 1942.
160 Id. at 1949; see also id. at 1950 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-
technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").
161 Id. at 1949.
162 Id. at 1950.
163 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
164 E.g., 6 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 17:4 (4th ed. 2007) ("Viewed at a basic
level, a suit for patent infringement is simply a specific example of a general civil action."); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There is one form of action-the civil action.").
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patent infringement cases the same way that it applies in other cases. 165 As a result,
"[i]nfringement complaints are usually sparse and conclusory."' 166
One of the key contributing factors to the sparse nature of complaints in pat-
ent infringement actions is Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 167
This form provides a sample complaint for patent infringement.' 68 Its content is
significant because the forms, by rule, are deemed to be sufficient pleadings.169
Specifically, the sample patent infringement complaint includes only five brief
elements: a statement of jurisdiction, a cursory statement about the ownership of
the patent, the allegedly infringing product, that the patentee provided notice to the
alleged infringer, and the relief demanded by the plaintiff. 1
70
165 See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (noting that "a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged infringer on no-
tice"); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1251 ("The principles of pleading simplicity and
brevity applicable to complaints in other actions also apply in infringement suits."); see also
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading stan-
dard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.").
166 MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 2-20; see also id. at 2-12 (noting that "[d]etails of the defen-
dants' allegedly infringing activities are rarely offered" in infringement complaints).
167 See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18. When the federal rules were initially enacted, this was Form 16,
rather than Form 18. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 16 (1938), reprinted at 303 U.S. 775-76.
168 FED. R. CrV. P. Form 18.
169 FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplic-
ity and brevity that these rules contemplate."); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(stating that the forms contained in the federal rules "plainly demonstrate" the pleading require-
ment under the rules), abrogated by Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); McZeal v.
Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing and applying Form 18 as
sufficient to state a claim for patent infringement). The Twombly Court also approved of the
forms as sufficient pleadings. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
170 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18. The complete form is as follows:
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction-See Form 7)
2. On date, United States Letters Patent No. _ were issued to the plaintiff
for an invention in an electric motor. The plaintiff owned the patent throughout
the period of the defendant's infringing acts and still owns the patent.
3. The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by mak-
ing, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented invention, and
the defendant will continue to do so unless enjoined by this court.
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The Federal Circuit has required a complaint for patent infringement to satisfy
a similarly minimal threshold. 171 For example, in Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality
Franchise Systems, Inc., a pre-Twombly decision, the court applied "the liberal
pleading standards" to a patent infringement complaint. 72 Specifically, the court
concluded that "[t]he Rule 12(b)(6) pleading requirements for a complaint of in-
fringement cannot be extended to require a plaintiff to specifically include each
element of the claims of the asserted patent."' 173 According to the court, "[t]o im-
pose such requirements would contravene the notice pleading standard, and would
add needless steps to the already complex process of patent litigation."' 74 Thus, a
patent holder only needs to allege "facts sufficient to put the alleged infringer on
notice." 115
4. The plaintiff has complied with the statutory requirement of placing a notice of
the Letters Patent on all electric motors it manufactures and sells and has given
the defendant written notice of the infringement.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands:
(a) a preliminary and final injunction against the continuing infringement;
(b) an accounting for damages; and
(c) interest and costs.
Id. Additionally, a caption is required, and the complaint must be dated and signed. See id.
17 Notably, the review of a district court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a procedural ques-
tion to which the Federal Cir~uit applies the law of the regional circuit. See, e.g., C&F Packing
Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The question of whether a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion was properly granted is a purely procedural question not pertaining to patent law, to which
this court applies the rule of the regional ... circuit."). However, an interesting dilemma arises, as
a regional circuit will never hear a patent case, so it can never provide guidance as to the pleading
standard to use for infringement claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006) (providing that the Fed-
eral Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases). See generally CBT Flint Part-
ners, L.L.C. v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (pointing out
this discrepancy). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has applied its own law, not the law of the regional
circuit, when evaluating whether an inequitable conduct claim has been pleaded with the particu-
larity required by Rule 9(b). See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
172 Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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The Federal Circuit maintained this liberal approach to pleading following
Twombly in McZeal v. Sprint Aextel Corp. 176 After reaffirming the Phonometrics
court's statement that a plaintiff did not need to allege each element of the claims of
the asserted patent, the court noted its belief that Twombly did not alter the pleading
requirements of Rule 8.177 Accordingly, any details regarding how the defendant's
product infringed the patent were unnecessary, as these details were "something to
be determined through discovery." 178 Notably, McZeal has been criticized and dis-
tinguished after the Iqbal decision. 
179
However, district courts are still divided over what the rules require a patentee
to plead, especially post-Twombly. 180 Initially, similar to the pre-Iqbal circuit split,
the Twombly decision itself generated confusion. 18' Some courts concluded that
the Supreme Court's decision had no effect on patent cases. 182 The majority of
courts, however, recognized that Twombly applied to patent infringement ac-
176 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
177 Id. at 1357 & n.4.
178 Id. at 1358. Notably, because the plaintiff was proceeding pro se, the court applied "the low bar
for pro se litigants to avoid dismissal on the basis of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)."
Id.
179 See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. ADS Group,_ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 938216,
at *4 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010) ("The decision in MeZeal, however, was motivated by a (per-
haps) misplaced indulgence of the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff. Of greater relevance, McZeal
was decided before the Iqbal decision made clear that Twombly's heightened pleading standard
applied to all cases, not merely those like Twombly that assert antitrust violations." (internal cita-
tion omitted)); Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF, 2010 WL 889541, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (noting that McZeal was "unhelpful" because it "was decided after
Twombly but before Iqbal' and because the plaintiff was proceeding pro se); Bender v. Motorola,
Inc., No. C 09-1245 SBA, 2010 WL 726739, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010) (describing a plain-
tiff's reliance on MeZeal as "misplaced").
180 See, e.g., LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., 2010 WL 889541, at *5 (noting the "lack of complete uniformity
in recent district court authority" on the pleading requirements in patent infringement actions fol-
lowing Twombly and Iqbal). See generally Yekaterina Korostash, Pleading Standards in Patent
Litigation After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Jan. 2008, at 1.
181 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 2 ("The courts are split, however, on the precise impact that
Twombly has on pleadings in patent cases.").
..2 See, e.g., CBT Flint Partners, L.L.C. v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379-80 (N.D.
Ga. 2007) (concluding that "Twombly did not alter pleading standards-especially in the patent
context").
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tions. 183 This split was resolved by the Supreme Court's conclusive statement in
Iqbal that the Twombly standard applied to all civil actions. 1
84
Iqbal did not, however, address the substantive pleading requirements for pat-
ent infringement actions. Over time, courts have split over two issues-and
Twombly only reignited this debate. First, courts often divide over the question of
whether the plaintiff must specify the claims in the patent that it believes the defen-
dant is infringing.' 85 Prior to Twombly, most courts did not require a plaintiff to
specify the infringed claims. 86  These courts relied upon the notice function of
pleadings and stressed that this notice function was satisfied without specifying the
patent claims that were being infringed. 187 Historically, however, a plaintiff was
required to plead with such specificity. 1
88
183 See, e.g., Anticancer Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ("The Court
finds that the new Bell Atlantic pleading standard applies to pleadings in patent infringement ac-
tions ...."); see also In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG Litig., 585 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34-
36 (D.D.C. 2008) (applying Twombly to a patent infringement action).
184 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1); see also Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that Iqbal "clarified that Twombly's plausibility
requirement applies across the board, not just to antitrust cases").
185 See, e.g., Franklin D. Kang, Pleading Patent Infringement Claims: Does Form 16 Suffice for All
Purposes?, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Winter 2006, at 25, 29 ("There is... a split of authority on
whether a complaint for patent infringement must specify the claims of the patent-in-suit alleged
to have been infringed.").
186 See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480-81 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
Tippmann Pneumatics, L.L.C. v. Brass Eagle, L.L.C., No. 1:04-CV-449-TLS, 2005 WL 2456908,
at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2005).
187 See, e.g., Tippmann Pneumatics, L.L.C., 2005 WL 2456908, at *2 ("A claim for patent infringe-
ment is sufficient to put the defendant on notice even if it does not state which patent claims were
infringed." (citing Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 794)).
See, e.g., J.D. Ferry Co. v. Macbeth Eng'g Corp., 11 F.R.D. 75, 76 (M.D. Pa. 1951) ("The general
practice in patent infringement suits has been to require the plaintiff to state what claims of a pat-
ent he alleges to have been infringed."); Coyne & Delany Co. v. G.W. Onthank Co., 10 F.R.D.
435, 436 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Marvel Slide Fastener Corp. v. Klozo Fastener Corp., 80 F. Supp. 366,
367 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Nat'l Nut Co. of Cal. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (N.D. I11.
1945); Bonney Supply Co. v. Heltzel, 243 F. 399, 404 (N.D. Ohio 1917) ("The complainant
knows, or should know, which of these separate claims are infringed; and it is therefore proper, in
the interest of greater certainty and definiteness, that it be required to specify which of the ten
claims it intends to rely on-in other words, give further and better particulars of the matter of in-
fringement contained in its pleading.").
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This trend has persisted following Twombly and Iqbal. Most courts continue
to hold that a plaintiff does not need to identify which claims it believes are being
infringed. 189 Notably, however, one court has concluded that the plaintiff must spe-
cifically plead the allegedly infringed claims. 190 As this court noted, "a plaintiff's
failure to specify which claims it believes are infringed by a defendant's products
places an undue burden on the defendant, who must wade through all the claims in
a patent and determine which claims might apply to its products to give a complete
response."191
The second area that has generated dispute is whether a plaintiff must specifi-
cally plead how the defendant is infringing the patent. 192 On this issue, the division
among courts is considerably more pronounced. Numerous courts, both before and
after Twombly, have concluded that some identification of the method of infringe-
ment is required. 193 Similar to the rationale behind requiring a plaintiff to allege
189 See, e.g., Ardente, Inc. v. Shanley, No. C 07-4479 MHP, 2010 WL 546485, at *5 n.6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2010) ("The court is unaware of any case holding that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal have now resulted in a strict requirement that a patent infringement plaintiff
plead the specific claims believed to have been infringed."); Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eye-
wear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Rambus, Inc. v. Nvidia Corp., No. C 08-
3343 SI, 2008 WL 4911165, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2008); Taltwell, L.L.C. v. Zonet USA
Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:07cv543, 2007 WL 4562874, at *14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2007).
190 Taurus IP, L.L.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
191 Id.; see also Ardente, Inc., 2010 WL 546485, at *5 n.6 ("[S]pecifying the patent claims allegedly
infringed enhances the plausibility of a patent infringement plaintiffs complaint.").
192 See Kang, supra note 185, at 26 ("There currently exists a split of authority on whether a com-
plaint for patent infringement must specify the defendant's products or services alleged to have in-
fringed the patent-in-suit and, if so, the degree of specificity required.").
193 See, e.g., Eidos Commc'ns, L.L.C. v. Skype Techs. SA,__ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 638337, at
*2-3 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2010); Taurus IP, L.L.C., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27 (W.D. Wis. 2008);
Windy City Innovations, L.L.C., v. Am. Online, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 278, 283 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (grant-
ing a defendant's motion to dismiss on an infringement claim because "a vague reference to
'other' unnamed products or services fails to provide the operative facts in relation to the alleged
infringement by those 'other' unnamed products or services"); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp.,
Inc., 926 F. Supp. 948, 961 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Paraffine Cos. v. Wieland, 17 F.2d 992, 993 (N.D.
Cal. 1927); Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF, 2010 WL 889541, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) ("Sufficient allegations would include, at a minimum, a brief description of
what the patent at issue does, and an allegation that certain named and specifically identified
products or product components also do what the patent does, thereby raising a plausible claim
that the named products are infringing."); Ware v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4:05-CV-
0156-RLV, 2010 WL 767094, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2010); Fifth Market, Inc. v. CME Group,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-520 GMS, 2009 WL 5966836, at *1 (D. Del. May 14, 2009) ("None of Fifth
Market's claims, however, contain any reference to a single infringing product or method ....
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specific claims, these courts stress how failing to identify the specific infringing
product or service imposes an undue burden on the defendant. 
94
For example, in one recent case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was
infringing its patent by "making, using, offering to sell and/or selling infringing
software and hardware products."1 95 However, the defendant produced at least 150
different types of products that had over 4000 possible end-user applications. 196 As
the court noted, "Form [18] simply does not address a factual scenario of this
sort." 197 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs allegations did not provide
fair notice to the defendant and therefore failed to satisfy Rule 8(a). 198
Another line of cases has reached the opposite conclusion and held that no
such identification is necessary, even post-Twombly.199 Again, these courts stress
Therefore, Fifth Market's complaint fails to provide the CME defendants with fair notice of the
claims and grounds for their entitlement to relief, and the court will grant [their] motion to dis-
miss."); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. 2:07-CV-00331-PMP-PAL, 2007 WL 2156332, at
*2 (D. Nev. July 26, 2007); eSoft, Inc. v. Astaro Corp., Civ. No. 06-cv-00441-REB-MEH, 2006
WL 2164454, at *2 (D. Colo. July 31, 2006); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Intergraph Corp., No. C 03-
2517-MJJ, 2003 WL 23884794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2003); see also Agilent Techs., Inc. v.
Micromuse, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 3090(RWS), 2004 WL 2346152, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004)
(holding that specifying the method of infringement was required, but that a Rule 12(e) motion
was the appropriate remedy).
194 See, e.g., Taurus IP, L.L.C., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1127; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Future
Graphics, L.L.C., No. 07CV00007, 2008 WL 160827, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2008); Hewlett-
Packard Co., 2003 WL 23884794, at *1.
'9' Hewlett-Packard Co., 2003 WL 23884794, at * 1 (emphasis omitted).
196 Id.
197 id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Mesh Comm, L.L.C. v. EKA Sys., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1064-T-33TGW, 2010 WL 750337,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2010) (concluding that vague infringement allegations lacking a reference
to a specific product were sufficient under Twombly); Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., Civ. Action
No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009); Digital Tech. Licensing L.L.C.
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., Civ. Action No. 07-5432 (SRC)(MAS), 2008 WL 4068930, at *4 (D.N.J.
Aug. 27, 2008) (concluding that a pleading that did not specify an infringing product was suffi-
cient and noting that "there is no binding precedent that requires a complaint to provide notice of
which of defendant's products infringe claims under the applicable patents"); Taltwell, L.L.C. v.
Zonet USA Corp., Civ. Action No. 3:07cv543, 2007 WL 4562874, at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20,
2007); Tippmann Pneumatics, L.L.C. v. Brass Eagle, L.L.C., No. 1:04-CV-449-TLS, 2005 WL
2456908, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2005); One World Techs., Ltd. v. Robert Bosch Tool
Corp., No. 04 C 0833, 2004 WL 1576696, at *2 (N.D. I11. July 13, 2004); see also Actus L.L.C. v.
Bank of Am. Corp., Civ. Action No. 2-09-cv-102-TJW, 2010 WL 547183, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
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the low bar posed by the notice function of pleadings and state that discovery will
allow a defendant to clarify the manner of infringement. 20 0 For example, one court
approved a complaint where the plaintiff alleged that its patent was infringed by the
defendant "'making, importing, offering for sale, selling, and/or using devices that
embody the patented methods, including [four] megabit and higher density
DRAMs. ' '' 20 1 The court concluded that even though this allegation referred to
"nearly all of [d]efendants' product line," it was sufficient because it followed
Form 18 and the defendant would receive more specific notice as discovery pro-
gressed.202 Thus, in patent infringement actions, courts continue to dispute the con-
tours of Twombly, Iqbal, and notice pleading generally.
Another issue is the inconsistency between Form 18, which, by rule, is a
model of a sufficient pleading, and the modem plausibility pleading standard.20 3
Indeed, post-Iqbal, some courts have reaffirmed that a complaint modeled after
Form 18 sufficiently states a claim. 20 4 In a recent unpublished decision, the Federal
Circuit also implied the continued vitality of Form 18 following Iqbal.20 5  The
10, 2010) ("The Court does not require that plaintiffs in a patent infringement lawsuit attach fully-
developed infringement contentions to its complaint.").
200 See, e.g., S.O.I.Tec Silicon Insulator Techs., S.A. v. Memc Elec. Materials, Inc., Civ. No. 08-292-
SLR, 2009 WL 423989, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 20, 2009); One World Techs., Ltd., 2004 WL
1576696, at *2. Another court noted that imposing this requirement on a plaintiff would require
an overly burdensome "Herculean investigation." Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Dell,
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-64 TS, 2008 WL 200340, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 2008). Interestingly, the court
made no mention of the potential burdens that this minimal pleading might impose on the defen-
dant. See id.
201 OKI Elec. Indus. Co. v. LG Semicon Co., No. CIV. 97-20310 SW, 1998 WL 101737, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 1998).
202 Id.
203 See Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF, 2010 WL 889541, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2010) ("As several courts have noted, it is difficult to reconcile the guidelines set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal with Form 18."); Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531
RS, 2009 WL 2972374, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) ("It is not easy to reconcile Form 18 with
the guidance of the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal; while the form undoubtedly provides a
'short and plain statement,' it offers little to 'show' that the pleader is entitled to relief."); see also
FED. R. Crv. P. 84 (stating that the appendix of forms are examples of sufficient pleadings).
204 See, e.g., Advanced Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc., No. C-09-1360 MMC, 2009 WL
1974602, at *1 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009); Iguana L.L.C. v. Lanham, No. 7:08-CV-09(CDL),
2009 WL 1620586, at *1-2 (M.D. Ga. June 9, 2009).
205 See Colida v. Nokia, Inc., No. 2009-1326, 2009 WL 3172724, at *2 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2009)
(concluding that the plaintiffs infringement claims were "facially implausible," but noting that he
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL
sparse allegations in this form appear to be the prototypical "[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," that
the Supreme Court in Iqbal rejected as insufficient.2 °6 The difficulties inherent in
this disparity are an issue that courts will be faced with in the post-Twombly era.
C. How Notice Pleading Enables Patent Litigation Abuse
As previously outlined, the patent litigation landscape is marred by an over-
abundance of nuisance-value suits. 20 7 Notice pleading facilitates the proliferation
of these suits in several ways.
1. Lowers Costs for Plaintiffs
First, notice pleading drastically lowers costs for plaintiffs.20 8 A patent in-
fringement complaint, as discussed earlier, is simple and typically only a few pages
in length.20 9 Thus, a plaintiff does not incur substantial costs to prepare and file
it. These factors incentivize the filing of nuisance-value infringement suits be-
cause a plaintiff does not stand to lose a significant amount of money by filing a
complaint.211 Instead, the plaintiff stands to profit from a likely quick settlement.21 2
In theory, a plaintiff in a patent infringement action, like all plaintiffs, would
still incur costs based on the presuit investigation requirement contained in Rule
had not argued that the complaint was sufficient under Form 18 and Rule 84 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
206 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)).
207 See supra Part I.C.
208 See, e.g., Marcus, Revival of Fact Pleading, supra note 124, at 477 (discussing notice pleading
and noting that "[t]he Federal Rules were designed, in part, to open the federal courts to those of
lesser means").
209 See supra Part IB; see also Tyler, supra note 100 (noting that patent infringement complaints are
usually only four or five pages long).
210 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 152. Indeed, if a patentee is represented on a contin-
gency fee basis, no costs are incurred.
211 See Tyler, supra note 100 ("A patent complaint requires remarkably little information.... Yet this
simple, non-specific complaint has a nuisance value of a few hundred thousand dollars the minute
it is filed and served.").
212 See supra Part I.C.
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11.213 Specifically, as outlined by the Federal Circuit, "Rule 11 requires an attor-
ney who files a patent infringement action to compare the accused device with the
construed patent claims. 214 This necessarily requires that the "attorney interpret
the pertinent claims of the patent in issue before filing a complaint alleging patent
infringement.",2 15 In other words, an attorney must, "at a bare minimum, apply the
claims of each and every patent that is being brought into the lawsuit to an accused
device and conclude that there is a reasonable basis for a finding of infringement of
at least one claim of each patent so asserted., 216 Thus, theoretically, an attorney
will conduct a pre-filing investigation that will include construing the patent's
claims and applying that construction to a specific product manufactured by the de-
fendant.21 7
Under the current notice pleading regime, however, this presuit investigation
requirement imposes few real costs on a plaintiff in an infringement case. Despite
the Federal Circuit's broad statements, often the actual presuit investigation re-
quired by courts is minimal. 218 The safe harbor provision in Rule 11 also allows
unscrupulous parties to easily get away with failing to conduct an investigation
prior to filing suit.219 A plaintiff does not need to disclose this Rule 1 1 determina-
213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)
("Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and
have determined that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and
'not interposed for any improper purpose."'); Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("The attorney has a duty prior to filing a complaint not only to conduct a reasonable
factual investigation, but also to perform adequate legal research ....").
214 Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Q-Pharma,
Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (Fed. Cir. 2004); View Eng'g, Inc. v. Ro-
botic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
215 Antonious, 275 F.3d at 1072.
216 View Eng'g, Inc., 208 F.3d at 986.
217 See id.
218 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 27 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (conclud-
ing that a pretrial investigation was sufficient when the only proof was a single entry in the plain-
tiffs privilege log that was never produced to the opposing party); Thomas I. Ross, Making Patent
Plaintiffs Pay, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., June 2006, at 1, 2 (noting that "Rule 11 is ineffective
as a sword against patent plaintiffs").
219 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2) (stating that a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 cannot be filed until
a party is given the opportunity to withdraw the challenged filing, claim, or other argument within
twenty-one days). See generally Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigo-
rating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555 (2001)
(describing how Rule 11 is easily circumvented by ill-intentioned attorneys).
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tion, either, making it difficult for a defendant to value the suit for settlement pur-
poses. 220 Further, the scope of a patent's claim is typically ambiguous and it is dif-
ficult to know with any certainty how a court will construe it. 22' This fact benefits
nuisance-value plaintiffs, as it allows them to bring actions that lack merit but sat-
isfy the minimal requirements of Rule 1 1.222 Thus, notice pleading undermines the
Rule 11 deterrent and further lowers the costs a plaintiff must incur prior to filing
an infringement complaint.
For example, in a recent case, the Federal Circuit considered whether a plain-
tiffs counsel had sufficiently investigated whether the defendant's website in-
fringed a patent for an interface between electronic and hard copies of docu-
ments.223 The plaintiff was a patent holding company that asserted numerous
identical infringement actions against a variety of companies.224 The court con-
cluded that the investigation was adequate because the plaintiffs counsel "exam-
ine[d] portions of [the defendant's] website and, based on his experience, con-
cfuded that it worked in a manner that infringed the [plaintiffs] patent. ' 225 As this
case illustrates, a cursory pre-filing inquiry can suffice in infringement cases-
demonstrating that this mechanism is not suitable for deterring the filing of nui-
sance-value suits.
2. Increases Costs for Defendants
Notice pleading also facilitates the filing of patent infringement suits, and
therefore nuisance-value settlements, by increasing an alleged infringer's costs, par-
ticularly the costs of responding to a complaint. As a general matter, notice plead-
ing is problematic when applied to technologically complex areas of the law be-
220 See FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (b) (stating that presenting a pleading to the court certifies, inter alia, that it
has been presented following a reasonable investigation); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)
("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."). Indeed, this information is also po-
tentially subject to the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. See MENELL ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 4-8.
221 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
222 Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 176-77.
223 Eon-Net L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x 189, 189-90 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
224 Id. at 197.
225 Id. at 196.
[VOL. 18:451
Particularizing Patent Pleading
cause it increases a defendant's response costs. 22 6 More specifically, the cases pre-
viously mentioned, both before and after Twombly, typically do not require a plain-
tiff to specify the claim being infringed, nor the allegedly infringing product or
process.227 Thus, an infringement complaint does not inform a defendant of what
the case is truly about, requiring a defendant to expend substantial resources in or-
der to effectively respond.228
These expenses generally result from the lack of two details in a complaint.
First, most patent infringement suits allege infringement of patents with numerous
claims, or assert infringement of several patents.229 As a result, a defendant must
expend time and effort interpreting each potentially applicable claim, performing
prior art searches for potential invalidity defenses, and preparing non-infringement
defenses, which typically require hiring experts. 230 This process often occurs dur-
ing the period before an answer is filed so that a defendant can assert any applicable
affirmative defenses. 231 This period is limited: twenty days after a complaint is
served, or sixty days if a defendant waives service of process.232 Responding in
this short period of time, therefore, entails significant costs and may preclude a de-
fendant from mounting an effective defense. 233  Further, unlike nuisance-value
plaintiffs, courts typically require defendants to plead additional detail for affirma-
tive defenses such as invalidity and inequitable conduct.234 Accordingly, even
226 See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 65 (2007) (noting how notice pleading does
not work well in complex litigation).
227 See supra Part II.B.
228 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 6.
229 E.g., Sudarshan, supra note 9, at 164-65.
230 Id. at 165; see also Donoghue, supra note 94, at 12-13 (describing this burden as "Herculean").
231 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).
232 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (outlining the process for waiver which
results in an extension of the time to answer).
233 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 3-4.
234 See MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 2-23 to 2-24 (discussing the heightened pleading require-
ments for inequitable conduct and noting that "[c]ourts can require defendants to identify specific
prior art references they intend to assert as invalidating and to disclose invalidity claims based on
written description, indefiniteness, or enablement"); N.D. CAL. LOCAL PATENT R. 3-3; see also in-
fra Part III.B (discussing the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to inequitable
conduct).
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without an effective Rule 1 1 limitation, defendants need to conduct additional in-
vestigation and incur unique costs in responding to an infringement complaint.235
Additionally, large companies are the most common target of nuisance-value
suits. 236 Since a plaintiff does not need to plead the specific method of infringe-
ment by a defendant, a large company will need to investigate which of its products
may be infringing-an expensive undertaking.237 Thus, overall, notice pleading
imposes significant costs on alleged infringers, which only further encourages nui-
sance-value settlements and, therefore, the filing of nuisance-value claims.
3. Prevents Early Dismissal
As previously discussed, the overall paradigm of the Federal Rules is that dis-
covery will expose meritless claims and that such claims can then be disposed of
through motions for summary judgment.238 Accordingly, the minimal pleading re-
quirements of Rule 8(a) were intended to prevent the dismissal of cases until after
239discovery occurs.
In the patent context, however, this minimal pleading threshold prevents dis-
missal until after costly, and typically lengthy, discovery has occurred. 240 As a re-
sult, accused infringers are forced to decide between settlement and incurring the
substantial expenses associated with discovery. 241 Further, these costs are dispro-
235 For example, a patent is presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), so a plaintiff does not need
to investigate the validity of a patent as part of its Rule 11 pre-filing investigation, whereas a de-
fendant would need to do so in order to assert an invalidity defense. See MENELL ET AL., supra
note 44, at 2-28 to 2-29; see also Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
236 See Douglas L. Price, Assessing the Patentability of Financial Services and Products, 3 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 157 (2004) ("[T]here has been a substantial increase in nuisance cases by smaller
companies who seek wealth by bringing patent infringement suits against larger companies."); see
also Bessen & Meurer, Lessons, supra note 26, at 14 (noting that "small firms and independent
inventors might engage in more opportunistic litigation").
237 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 12-13.
238 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 226, at 69-70 (noting the link between pleading standards and dis-
covery); see also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
240 See, e.g., Donoghue, supra note 94, at 6; Heller & Gollin, supra note 97, § 70.01 (discussing the
costs of discovery in patent infringement actions); see also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying
text.
241 Donoghue, supra note 94, at 6; Harkins, supra note 59, at 443-44.
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portionately allocated to defendants.242 It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that a large percentage of infringement cases settle before discovery fully begins.243
For these reasons, notice pleading facilitates the proliferation of nuisance-value
patent infringement claims.
IV. The Use of Heightened Pleading for Patent Infringement Actions
As the above analysis demonstrates, notice pleading is problematic in patent
infringement actions. But are there any alternatives? This section explores the use
of heightened, or particularized, pleading. Essentially, this alternative requires a
plaintiff to plead more detail in support of a claim. Implementing this approach in
patent cases presents an opportunity to remedy the ills caused by notice pleading
and to begin addressing the current patent litigation predicament.
A. Heightened Pleading and Its Use in Other Areas
Other areas of the law use heightened pleading as a mechanism to reduce the
amount of costly, time-consuming, and often frivolous litigation.244 Examining
some of these areas, along with the rationales for why heightened pleading was im-
plemented, provides a useful background for why adopting a similar approach is
appropriate for patent infringement actions.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain one prominent example of
heightened pleading requirements. Rule 9 states that "a party must state with par-
ticularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake., 245 Generally, courts
have interpreted this language to require a plaintiff to plead facts regarding who
made a false statement, when and where it was made, as well as the content of the
statement.246 Depending on the specific subject matter, some courts require even
more detail.247
242 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
243 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 131-32.
244 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) ("On certain subjects understood
to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater par-
ticularity than Rule 8 requires.").
245 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
246 See, e.g., Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Put
simply, Rule 9(b) requires 'the who, what, when, where, and how' to be laid out." (quoting Wil-
liams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1997))); U.S. ex rel. Costner v. United
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The requirement of particularized facts has several rationales.2 48 First, it dis-
courages meritless claims of fraud or mistake, which are frequently advanced solely
for their settlement value and which impose substantial costs on courts and par-
ties.249 Second, these claims cover such a wide variety of potential conduct that a
defendant needs more information about the plaintiffs claim in order to prepare a
responsive pleading.25° Particularity is also premised on the fact that fraud and
mistake claims involve alleged conduct that incorporates some degree of moral tur-
pitude, so particularity is needed to protect defendants from lightly made claims.25'
These considerations resulted in the particularity requirement in cases of fraud and
mistake.
2. Securities Fraud
Securities fraud is one area where heightened pleading has been adopted by
statute. Pursuant to federal securities statutes and their accompanying implement-
States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 9(b) requires a claim to "identify who,
what, where, when, and how"); Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating that Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to specify "the time, place, and content of the alleged
false or fraudulent representations" (quoting Powers v. Boston Cooper Corp., 926 F.2d 109, 111
(1st Cir. 1991))); Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir. 2001); Harri-
son v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999); 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 117, § 1297.
247 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1297.
248 For a complete discussion of the rationales for Rule 9(b), see 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
117, § 1296.
249 See, e.g., Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009); U.S. ex rel. Williams v.
Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004); U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab.
Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (1 th Cir. 2002); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117,
§ 1296; see also Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that Rule
9(b) serves to "eliminate fraud actions in which all the facts are learned through discovery after
the complaint is filed").
250 See, e.g., Williams, 389 F.3d at 1256; Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1310; Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203
F.3d 1202, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2000); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1296.
251 See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125 (noting that a purpose of Rule 9(b) is "to protect those whose repu-
tation would be harmed as a result of being subject to fraud charges"); Ackerman v. Nw. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir.
1996); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 1992) ("This higher standard stems
from the obvious concerns that general, unsubstantiated charges of fraud can do damage to a de-
fendant's reputation."); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, § 1296.
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ing regulations, private individuals can bring a civil action for securities fraud.252
The federal securities statutes forbid publicly traded companies from using "any
manipulative or deceptive device" in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. 253 Further, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 prohibits, in part,
making "any untrue statement of a material fact," or failing "to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading., 254 Courts
have implied the right to a private damages action from these sources.
215
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, over
256the President's veto, to address alleged abuses in securities litigation. A key sec-
tion of this legislation involved heightening the pleading requirements for private
securities fraud actions.257 Specifically, the Act required a complaint for securities
fraud, for each alleged violation, to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 2 58
These heightened pleading standards were designed to "curb perceived abuses
of the [section] 10(b) private action. 259 Specifically, Congress noted the practice
of routinely filing costly and burdensome lawsuits for the purpose of extracting
"exorbitant 'settlements.' ' 260  The high costs of these suits created incentives for
252 E.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) ("Private federal securities fraud
actions are based upon federal securities statutes and their implementing regulations.").
253 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); see also id. § 78u-4(b).
254 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2009).
255 E.g., Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341 ("The courts have implied from these statutes and Rule
a private damages action, which resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for
deceit and misrepresentation."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
("The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
256 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]; Marcus, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 117,
at 1765.
257 See PSLRA § 1, 109 Stat. at 746-47.
258 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Several courts have concluded that this statutory pleading stan-
dard is essentially the same standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See, e.g., Institu-
tional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009); Rubke v. Capitol Ban-
corp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1165 (9th Cir. 2009); Miss. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008).
259 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007).
260 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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parties to quickly settle, which only further encouraged the filing of additional
claims.26' In other words, heightened pleading addressed the problems of "nui-
sance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests,
and manipulation by class action lawyers. 262  Thus, a more robust pleading re-
quirement was implemented in securities fraud cases to limit such nuisance-value
suits.
B. Applying a Heightened Pleading Standard to Patent Infringement
Actions
Similar to these other types of cases, patent infringement litigation, as previ-
ously outlined, is expensive, time-intensive, and increasingly brought by nuisance-
value plaintiffs.263 As a result, like these other substantive areas, the pleading re-
quirements for patent cases should be raised to curb litigation abuse. 26
Initially, it is important to note that the pleading with particularity required by
Rule 9(b) currently has limited application in patent cases. The sole area where
courts apply the rule is to the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct. 265 This
defense alleges that the patentee, when applying for the patent, intended to mislead
or deceive the patent examiner and "fail[ed] to disclose material information or
261 Seeid. at31.
262 Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 320 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
263 See supra Part I.
264 Notably, other countries have imposed particularity requirements for pleading patent infringement
actions. See, e.g., CPR 63.9 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/
pdf/parts/part63.pdf (requiring "particulars" in pleading patent infringement claim); see also CPR
63.9, PD 11.1 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/
pdf/practice -directions/pd-part63.pdf ("In a claim for infringement of a patent-(l) the statement
of case must--(a) show which of the claims in the specification of the patent are alleged to be in-
fringed; and (b) give at least one example of each type of infringement alleged . . ."). For a
broader discussion of pre-trial patent procedure internationally, see generally Brian Daley et al.,
Pre-trial Proceedings in Patent Infringement Actions: A Comparison Among Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States ofAmerica, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 113 (2007).
265 See, e.g., Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cent.
Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1356-
57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., L.L.C., 350 F.3d 1327,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.
Ala. 2007) (listing cases); David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application By the District
Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 895, 905 (2003) ("A long line of
district courts have held that Rule 9(b) applies to inequitable conduct claims.").
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submit[ted] materially false information to the PTO during prosecution. 2 66  If
proven, it renders the patent unenforceable. 67 Because this defense is essentially a
"fraud on the Patent Office," courts apply Rule 9(b) and require that it be plead
with particularity.2 68 However, courts have resisted expanding the particularity re-
quirement to other areas of patent law. 269
1. Heightened Patent Pleading Generally
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and given
the current patent litigation predicament, it is time to revisit the application of
heightened pleading requirements to infringement actions. But what would a par-
ticularized patent pleading regime look like?
266 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Exergen
Corp., 575 F.3d at 1327 n.3 ("The substantive elements of inequitable conduct are: (1) an individ-
ual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application made an affirmative misrep-
resentation of a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material
information; and (2) the individual did so with a specific intent to deceive the PTO."); Bruno In-
dep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see
also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009) ("Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a
duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentabil-
ity as defined in this section.").
267 E.g., Digital Control, Inc., 437 F.3d at 1313; Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d
1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A determination of inequitable conduct during the prosecution of a
patent application renders the subsequently issued patent unenforceable.").
268 E.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The charge
was formerly known as 'fraud on the Patent Office,' a more pejorative term, but the change of
name does not make the thing itself smell any sweeter."); see also Venetec Int'l, Inc. v. Nexus
Med., L.L.C., 541 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618 (D. Del. 2008) ("Because inequitable conduct is a claim
sounding in fraud, Rule 9(b) applies which requires the elements of inequitable conduct to be pled
with particularity."). Specifically, the Federal Circuit has held that "in pleading inequitable con-
duct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and
how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO." Exergen Corp.,
575 F.3d at 1327.
269 See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d
1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (declining to apply Rule 9 to a claim for willful infringement); Fergu-
son Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., L.L.C., 350 F.3d 1327,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Willfulness does not equate to fraud, and thus, the pleading requirement
for willful infringement does not rise to the stringent standard required by Rule 9(b).").
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Generally, heightened pleading would require the pleading of additional detail
to support an infringement claim. 70 More specifically, adopting a heightened
pleading standard would require a plaintiff, similar to the approach currently
adopted by some courts, to specifically identify the claims of the patent that a de-
fendant is allegedly infringing. 27 It would also require a plaintiff to specifically
allege how the defendant is infringing.27 Thus, a plaintiff would need to identify
how the defendant's products, processes, or acts infringe specific patent claims.
This modification could also have implications for the pleading of patent
claim construction. As previously outlined, ambiguity in the current claim con-
struction jurisprudence allows nuisance-value patentees to undermine the efficacy
of the Rule 11 pre-suit investigation requirement.273 A particularity requirement,
however, could incorporate requiring a patentee to include in the complaint how it
is construing the patent's claims to come to the conclusion that the defendant is in-
fringing. After all, the plaintiff, in theory, should be conducting a claim construc-
tion analysis prior to filing suit anyway.274 Although plaintiffs could amend their
complaint as discovery progressed, they would still be required to make an initial
showing of sufficient facts before discovery could begin. 275 By requiring plaintiffs
to initially plead this claim construction, defendants would receive additional notice
and the purposes of Rule 11 would be more effectively vindicated.276
A heightened pleading standard in infringement suits would also address the
perverse incentives created by the current use of notice pleading.277 First, it would
increase a nuisance-value plaintiff's costs of filing an infringement suit because the
270 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 987, 988 (2003) (not-
ing that heightened pleading requires "greater factual detail").
271 Donoghue, supra note 94, at 3; see also supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
272 Donoghue, supra note 94, at 10.
273 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
275 This is because a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is made before discovery begins.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). A patentee would always be able to move the court to amend the complaint
if necessary, which the rules state that a court should "freely give ... when justice so requires."
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
276 Cf William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L.
REv. 959, 969-71 (1987) (arguing that Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) should be harmonized and greater
particularity required as needed for notice).
277 See supra Part I.C.
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complaint would take more time and effort to prepare, and plaintiffs would be
forced to incur presuit investigatory costs. 278 These additional costs would make
obtaining a nuisance-value settlement more difficult, thereby reducing the incentive
to file a nuisance-value action.279
Second, a heightened pleading standard would provide an opportunity for de-
fendants to avoid some of the costs associated with responding to nuisance-value
suits. Insufficient pleading is addressed through a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. 28° A defendant makes this motion prior to filing an answer. 281 Be-
cause affirmative defenses, such as patent invalidity, are not raised until an answer
is filed,282 this means that a defendant would not have to incur the significant costs
of preparing an invalidity defense until the court rules on the motion. 283  Thus,
heightened pleading allows a defendant to put off many of the costs associated with
responding to an infringement claim and reduces the incentive to immediately agree
to nuisance-value settlements.
Additionally, heightened pleading would theoretically limit the costs a defen-
dant would need to incur in order to prepare an answer in response to a nuisance-
value infringement claim. A defendant would no longer be forced to determine
which patent claims were at issue or how those claims were being infringed when
preparing its answer.284 Although a plaintiff could seek to amend these claims, a
defendant could then move to amend its answer in response or argue that permitting
the plaintiffs amendment would not be in the interests of justice. 285 By shifting
278 See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 75 (2002) (noting that a heightened
pleading regime will require a plaintiff to conduct a "thorough investigation and well-conceived
pleading from the beginning of a case").
279 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 176-77 (noting how doctrinal shifts by courts affect pat-
entees' willingness to bring infringement suits).
280 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
281 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
282 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
283 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
284 See supra Part lI.B.
285 See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Several courts have denied plaintiff-patentees' motions to amend pur-
suant to this provision. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36-37 (D.
Mass. 2006) (denying a patentee's motion to amend the complaint where it would be prejudicial
and overly burdensome to the defendant); Ameritek, Inc. v. Carolina Lasercut Corp., 891 F. Supp.
254, 255-56 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (same).
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this burden to the plaintiff, it would also provide another disincentive for plaintiffs
contemplating filing a nuisance-value suit.
286
Similarly, more stringent pleading requirements would also facilitate the early
dismissal of dubious infringement claims.287 Heightened pleading would allow for
early dismissal of these claims before the discovery process begins.288 This is ob-
viously related to lowering a defendant's costs, because the earlier a patent case is
resolved, the fewer costs a defendant must incur.289 Thus, overall, particularized
pleading in patent infringement cases would impose additional costs on plaintiffs
and lower the burden on defendants, reducing the incentives that currently foster
the filing of nuisance-value infringement claims.
Moreover, adopting more stringent pleading requirements would effectuate
the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. In Twombly, the Court sent a
clear signal that the particularity required in pleading a substantive cause of action
should be linked to the practical realities associated with that cause of action, and
recognized how pleading standards can serve as a critical tool in streamlining litiga-
tion and its costs. 290 Essentially, the Court recognized that in certain types of cases,
286 See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manda-
tory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REv. 1849, 1856 (2004) (stating that a factor in the success of
a nuisance-value litigation strategy is the cost to the initiating party versus the cost of an opposing
party responding).
287 See Marcus, Revival of Fact Pleading, supra note 124, at 454 (arguing that pleadings practice
should be used to resolve cases on the merits); see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304
n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that "the Twombly standard is even more favorable to dismissal of a
complaint").
288 See supra note 275 and accompanying text; see also U.S. ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d
180, 185 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that Twombly "raises a hurdle in front of what courts had previ-
ously seen as a plaintiff's nigh immediate access to discovery" and noting that "[in cases of fraud,
Rule 9(b) has long played that screening function, standing as a gatekeeper to discovery").
289 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 131.
290 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-60 (2007) ; see also Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that lqbal and Twombly sought to address "the recog-
nized problems created by 'strike suits' . . . and the high costs of frivolous litigation"); Smith v.
Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The [Twombly] Court held that in complex litigation.
. the defendant is not to be put to the cost of pretrial discovery-a cost that in complex litigation
can be so steep as to coerce a settlement on terms favorable to the plaintiff even when his claim is
very weak-unless the complaint says enough about the case to permit an inference that it may
well have real merit."). This position has previously appeared in the Court's jurisprudence. E.g.,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528
n.17 (1983) ("Certainly, in a case of this magnitude, a district court must retain the power to insist
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practical realities interfere with the notice function of complaints. 29' Similar con-
cerns were raised in Iqbal.292 The potential benefits of heightening these require-
ments indicate that courts should seize this opportunity to address the current patent
litigation predicament.293
2. Interaction with Form 18 and the Need for Revision
A significant related issue is how a heightened pleading requirement would
interact with Form 18, which requires only a few cursory statements in order for a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. 294 These minimal requirements conflict
with Twombly and Iqbal, which require a plaintiff to provide a more "plausible"
pleading.295
This inconsistency dictates the revision of Form 18.296 These revisions could
incorporate a heightened pleading standard. 297  The form was originally drafted
when the rules were first promulgated in 1938.298 Since that time, it has not under-
gone any substantive revisions.299
upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
291 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-59.
292 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 569 F.3d
708, 710 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that "Iqbal reinforces Twombly's message").
293 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 13; see also Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36
PEPP. L. REv. 1063, 1067 (2009) ("As the costs of litigation increase and the scope of discovery
expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards increases.").
294 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (2009)
(noting the tension between the forms and the pleading standard outlined in Twombly); see also
supra notes 167-70.
295 See supra notes 202, 206 and accompanying text.
296 See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("One can only hope that the rulemaking process will eventually result in
eliminating the form, or at least in revising it to require allegations specifying which claims are in-
fringed, and the features of the accused device that correspond to the claim limitations.").
297 See id.
298 See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 16 (1938), reprinted at 303 U.S. 775-76.
299 Compare id., with FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18; see McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). In 1963, the prayer for relief section of the form was amended to con-
form to the language of 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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Patent law, however, has undergone significant changes since 1938, which
have not been accounted for in the form.300  During the early twentieth century,
through a series of decisions, the Supreme Court established a clear anti-patent
framework, which one commentator described as its "most virulent anti-patent
era."' 30 1 Thus, the federal rules were drafted in an era of limited patent rights.
However, since that time, two significant changes occurred. First, the passage
of the 1952 Patent Act represented a doctrinal shift in patent law.30 2 Generally, the
Act overturned the Supreme Court's prior anti-patent jurisprudence.3 3 For exam-
ple, changes in the joint inventorship doctrine made patent invalidation less
likely.30 4 The Act also clarified what rights a patent conferred and approved of the
corporate patent strategy of acquiring "blocking patents."
' 30 5
300 See generally Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187 (2000).
301 Id. at 2223; see David Silverstein, Patents, Science, and Innovation: Historical Linkages and Im-
plications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261,
304 (1991) (describing this period as the "Dark Ages" in the history of the U.S. patent system);
see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) ("The
function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be sustained when,
on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled arti-
sans."); id. at 158 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The patent involved in the present case belongs to
this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy
and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dra-
matically illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the constitutional standards
which are supposed to govern."); Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 566-68 (1949)
(invalidating a patent for "want of invention"); id. at 572 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on"); Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-69 (1944) (stating that "the limits of the pat-
ent are narrowly and strictly confined to the terms of the grant" and deciding to "limit substan-
tially the doctrine of contributory infringement"); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1941) (adopting a heightened test for patentability, which was to be strictly
applied, that required a "flash of creative genius").
302 See Bryson Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952); Merges, supra note 300, at 2221-24.
303 Merges, supra note 300, at 2223.
304 Merges, supra note 300, at 2222.
305 Merges, supra note 300, at 2222; see also Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372,
1379 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A 'blocking patent' is an earlier patent that must be licensed in order
to practice a later patent. This often occurs, for instance, between a pioneer patent and an im-
provement patent.").
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Second, the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982 effected significant changes in
patent law.30 6 In addition to making it easier to obtain a patent, the Federal Circuit
has made patents easier to enforce.30 7 The court also made a substantial impact on
the remedies available for infringement.308 In short, the creation of the Federal Cir-
cuit served to expand patent rights well beyond their scope when the federal rules,
and thus Form 18, were drafted. Overall, these changes in patent law since the
1930s are in stark contrast to the relative stability of other substantive legal theo-
ries, such as negligence, which are also illustrated in the official forms.
30 9
Additionally, patents themselves are significantly more complex today than
they were when Form 18 was originally drafted. As the twentieth century pro-
gressed, there was a drastic increase in the number of claims per patent. 3 10 The un-
derlying technology also became significantly more complicated during this pe-
riod.31 1  Further, as previously mentioned, patents play a much larger role in
312
modem society. For example, in 1938, 43,130 patents were issued, out of 75,006
applications.31 3 In contrast, in 2008, over four times as many patents were issued
306 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006)); Merges, supra note 300, at 2224; Susan Sell, Intellectual
Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 267, 310 (2004) ("The United States' establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit ... in 1982 also institutionalized a more pro-patent approach.").
307 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 18; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 115-23 (out-
lining how the Federal Circuit expanded patentable subject matter and made invalidity challenges
more difficult).
308 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 35, at 110-16 (discussing how the Federal Circuit has strength-
ened the remedies available to a patentee for infringement).
309 See Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform, 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 779, 780 (2007) (noting the "relative stability in tort law throughout much of the twentieth
century"). The Federal Rules contain an illustrative form for negligence. FED. R. Crv. P. Form 11.
This form also has not changed significantly over time. Compare id., with FED. R. Civ. P. Form 9
(1938), reprinted at 308 U.S. 771.
310 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Pat-
ent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 81 (2002) ("Patents issued in the 1990s contained approximately
50% more claims than patents issued in the 1970s.").
3" E.g., id. at 79-80.
312 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
313 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY: CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO THE
PRESENT, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h-counts.pdf
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out of almost seven times as many applications.314 These changes only provide ad-
ditional reasons to re-evaluate the content of Form 18 and the pleading require-
ments in patent infringement actions.3t 5
Alternatively, courts should interpret Form 18 in light of Twombly and Iqbal.
For example, the sample infringement allegation in Form 18 is that "[t]he defendant
has infringed and is still infringing ... by making, selling, and using electric mo-
tors., 316  Several post-Twombly decisions have interpreted the use of the term
"electric motors" as requiring a plaintiff to plead the specific product or method of
infringement. 317  Another court narrowly interpreted the form as only applying
when the plaintiff alleged solely direct infringement. 318 Accordingly, the claim that
an alleged infringer "directly and/or indirectly" infringed the patents at issue pre-
cluded the patentee from relying on Form 18. 3' 9
These decisions, however, are not uniform and, indeed, may not go far
enough in the amount of information they require a patentee to plead. As a result,
revising the form to require more detailed allegations is a preferable mechanism for
addressing the problems created by notice pleading in patent infringement actions,
and best effectuates Twombly and Iqbal.
314 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
315 See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); cf Vangelis Economu, Sacking Super Sack: Using Existing Rules to
Prevent Patentees from Fleeing an Improvident Patent Infringement Lawsuit, 8 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 90 (2008) (discussing how courts can interpret procedural mechanisms in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit patent litigation abuse).
316 FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18.
317 See, e.g., Eidos Commc'ns, L.L.C. v. Skype Techs. SA, - F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 638337, at
*4 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2010) ("The complaint at bar does not mimic Form 18, insofar as no category
of product (or general identification of a process or method) is identified."); Bender v. Motorola,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 09-1245 SBA, 2010 WL 726739, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010) ("The form
contemplates that the pleader identify the accused device with some semblance of specificity to
alert the alleged infringer which device is at issue. It does not contemplate that the accused device
or devices be described in terms of a multiplicity of generically-described product lines ....");
Ware v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4:05-CV-0156-RLV, 2010 WL 767094, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 5, 2010); Fifth Market, Inc. v. CME Group, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-520 GMS, 2009 WL
5966836, at *1 (D. Del. May 14, 2009) ("Form 18 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 makes
clear that, at a minimum, Fifth Market must allege, in general terms, an infringing product.").
318 See Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. Civ. A. 09-01531 RS, 2009 WL 2972374, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009).
319 Id.
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C. Counter-Arguments to Heightened Pleading
Twombly and Iqbal are not without their critics.32° Indeed, legislation has al-
ready been introduced in Congress to overrule them.3 ' Many of these criticisms
equally apply in the patent infringement context. In the end, however, the unique
aspects of patent litigation indicate that the potential disadvantages of adopting
heightened pleading for patent infringement are minimal.
1. Increased Patent Enforcement Costs
Heightened pleading reduces the incentive to file a nuisance-value suit, in
part, by imposing additional costs on a plaintiff.322 These additional costs, how-
ever, would not fall solely on nuisance-value plaintiffs.323 Instead, they would ap-
ply to all patent holders and potentially make enforcement of patent rights more dif-
ficult, particularly because it would lead to the dismissal of at least some
meritorious claims.324 Because the primary justification of patents is their ability to
320 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the majority as enacting a "fundamental-and unjustified-change in the character of pretrial
practice"); Spencer, supra note 148, at 433 (concluding that Twombly is "an unwarranted interpre-
tation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court"); Edi-
torial, Throwing Out Mr. Iqbal's Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A28 (stating that Iqbal
represents "[t]he [C]ourt's conservative majority ... increasingly using legal technicalities to keep
people from getting a fair hearing").
321 See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 11 1th Cong. § 2 (stating that "a Federal
court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)"); Open Access to Courts Act, H.R. 4115, 11th Cong. (2009) ("A
court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c), or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a com-
plaint under one of those subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual
contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff's claim to be plausible ... .
322 See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
323 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L.
REv. 873, 910-11 (2009) (discussing how heightened pleading, like any case-screening mecha-
nism, affects both legitimate and meritless suits).
324 See Spencer, supra note 148, at 481 (noting that "plausibility pleading rejects potentially valid,
meritorious claims").
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incentivize innovation, making enforcement more difficult could have a detrimental
impact on the incentive function of patents.325
In reality, however, this fear is unfounded. While some costs may be new,
the particularized allegations that heightened pleading would entail are not impos-
ing any costs that are not theoretically already required. 6 Indeed, according to
Rule 11, plaintiffs should be performing a pre-suit investigation anyway, at least to
the extent possible, but notice pleading currently allows some of them to effectively
shirk this responsibility.3 27  A heightened pleading requirement would therefore
only impose additional costs on those unscrupulous plaintiffs that currently take
advantage of this disparity. 328 Thus, instead of requiring plaintiffs to discover more
facts, heightened pleading merely requires that they put them into the complaint. 329
Certainly, the new pleading regime would have some effect at the margins on
the ability to enforce some patents. Infringement of some types of patents may be
impossible to discover without the benefit of the broad discovery rules included in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 330 For example, process patents may become
more difficult to enforce, especially if infringement occurs behind closed doors. 331
325 See Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEcIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 587, 626 (2006) (noting that "a hobbled enforcement regime can greatly reduce [a
patent system's] incentive value").
326 See Donoghue, supra note 94, at 3 ("Holding plaintiffs to a heightened pleading standard will not
substantially increase a patent plaintiffs pre-filing burden.").
327 See supra Part II.C. 1.
328 Unfortunately, no empirical data is available that would permit an estimate as to what percentage
of patent infringement suits currently fall into this category.
329 Indeed, to the extent additional pre-filing requirements are imposed, as one commentator points
out, requiring a greater investment in pre-filing investigation can "pay dividends later in the litiga-
tion if the results help guide a more efficient discovery process." Bone, supra note 323, at 926-
27.
330 See Jeffrey I. D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement Investiga-
tions of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5, 19 (2002) (noting
that it may be difficult for a plaintiff to establish infringement of a process patent prior to discov-
ery); see also MENELL ET AL., supra note 44, at 2-29 (noting that "some infringement (for exam-
ple, of software patents) is difficult to ascertain from publicly available information").
331 See Lewis & Cody, supra note 330, at 7 ("When it comes to determining whether a process or
business method infringes a patent, the inquiry is often illusive because critical information is not
available to the patent holder."); see also Spencer, supra note 148, at 481 (noting that heightened
pleading prevents discovery "in circumstances where the needed supporting facts lie within the
exclusive possession of the defendants").
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These cases, however, would likely be few and far between, and other methods ex-
ist to ensure the viability of enforcing these patents. 332 Thus, the overall benefits of
adopting heightened pleading would justify any minimal costs that are created for
this small subset of claims.
2. Alternate Mechanisms to Potentially Curb Abuse
Another potential counterargument is that other mechanisms currently in
place can be used to more effectively deter frivolous claims. One such mechanism
is the possibility of sanctions.333 Sanctions, however, have proven to be ineffective
at addressing the problem. As previously noted, the ambiguous nature of claim
scope allows plaintiffs to file suits that will be unsuccessful at trial but are suffi-
cient to comply with Rule 11.334
Antitrust claims based on the patentee's filing of infringement claims are an-
other potential mechanism for curbing patent litigation abuse. Generally, a patent
does not implicate antitrust laws, even though a patent grants its holder a monopoly
over the patented invention.335 However, if a patentee abuses this right and brings
"sham" litigation, antitrust liability may arise.336 This liability requires both that
the litigation be baseless and that it be brought in bad faith.337
332 See 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a process patent has been in-
fringed by a product as long as the patentee makes "a reasonable effort to determine the process
actually used in the production of the product"); see also 3 MoY, supra note 164, § 12:42 (stating
that few cases have used this section).
333 These sanctions could stem from several sources. First, as previously discussed, Rule 11 provides
such a mechanism. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b). The U.S. Code also has a patent-specific section al-
lowing a court to award attorney's fees in "exceptional" cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). Fi-
nally, a court also has the inherent power to award fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
334 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
335 See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A patent
owner who brings a suit for infringement, without more, is generally exempt from the antitrust
laws for that action ...."); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[T]he antitrust laws do not negate the patentee's right to exclude others from patent property").
336 See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc., 360 F.3d at 1304-05; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897
F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("When a patent owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield
to protect his invention, but as a sword to eviscerate competition unfairly, that owner may be
found to have abused the grant and may become liable for antitrust violations when sufficient
power in the relevant market is present."); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 990 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("The bringing of a series of ill-founded patent infringement actions, in bad faith, can
constitute an antitrust violation in and of itself if such suits are initiated or pursued with an intent
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Standing alone, these claims are ineffective at curbing infringement litigation
abuse. Initially, alleged infringers typically raise antitrust violations as counter-
claims. 338 Thus, they do not affect the initial costs a defendant must incur-in fact,
adding an antitrust counterclaim significantly increases the overall cost of the litiga-
tion. 339 Second, these claims are difficult, if not impossible, to win. 340 This is be-
cause of legal doctrines that present difficult hurdles, such as the fact that courts
presume that an infringement suit has been brought in good faith. 34 ' Thus, antitrust
claims are ineffective at reining in nuisance-value infringement suits.
An additional alternate mechanism is the use of local patent rules. Currently,
many district courts adopt local procedural rules specifically for patent cases.
342
These rules may require a patentee to disclose the specific patent claims at issue
and the manner of infringement early in litigation.343 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
to monopolize a particular industry (and, of course, the other elements of a Section 2 violation are
present).").
337 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("[A] sham suit must be both subjectively brought in bad faith and based on a theory of either in-
fringement or validity that is objectively baseless."); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat
Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
338 E.g., David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement
Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 95
(2001).
339 Indeed, in Twombly, the Supreme Court quoted an opinion by Judge Posner discussing the signifi-
cant costs of patent antitrust cases. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quot-
ing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner,
J., sitting by designation)).
340 See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 10, at 539 ("Antitrust law does not reach opportunistic litigation be-
cause the purpose of such litigation is to extract a settlement payment, not to exclude a rival.");
see also Meurer, supra note 10, at 540 ("[Antitrust] claims based on sham litigation are very
common, but almost never successful." (footnote omitted)).
341 See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The law recog-
nizes a presumption that the assertion of a duly granted patent is made in good faith; this presump-
tion is overcome only by affirmative evidence of bad faith." (citation omitted)); Carpet Seaming
Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam Inc., 616 F.2d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[I]nfringement
suits are presumed to be in good faith, a presumption which can be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence.").
342 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. LOCAL PATENT R., available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Rules:
Civil Rules" hyperlink); E.D. TEX. LOCAL PATENT R., available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/
Rules/LocalRules/Documents/Appendix%20M.pdf.
343 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. LOCAL PATENT R. 3-1; E.D. TEX. LOCAL PATENT R. 3-1; see also Advanced
Analogic Techs., Inc. v. Kinetic Techs., Inc., No. C-09-1360, 2009 WL 1974602, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
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has held that "local rules requiring the early disclosure of infringement and invalid-
ity contentions and requiring amendments to contentions to be filed with diligence"
are consistent with the notice pleading regime in the Federal Rules.
344
Local rules facilitate the efficient resolution of patent cases. The problem,
however, is that by definition, these rules are not uniforn. 345 Further, these rules
still do not provide needed specificity until after a defendant has incurred signifi-
cant costs responding to the complaint.346 In fact, many of these rules do not re-
quire specific disclosure until after the discovery process has begun. 347  Finally,
even though the rules facilitate efficient resolution of cases, they do not necessarily
facilitate expedient resolution.348 Even with these rules, infringement cases can still
take well over a year to resolve. 349 Thus, although the use of local rules, like other
potential mechanisms, is beneficial, standing alone, it will not address many of the
core issues that foster the growth of nuisance-value infringement claims.
V. Conclusion
Pleading is just one of the problematic issues in a patent system that some
commentators describe as a "drag on innovation., 350 In fact, legislation is currently
pending in Congress to enact widespread, comprehensive patent reform.3 51 In any
July 8, 2009) (denying a motion for a more definite statement because "Patent Local Rule 3-1 re-
quires AATI to identify by name and model number and no later than ten days after the initial case
management conference, each accused product, device, and apparatus").
344 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
345 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
346 See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
347 See id. (noting that local rules have ameliorated some of the problems with notice pleading but
"do nothing to require an adequate statement of the claim before discovery commences").
348 Interestingly, the Eastern District of Virginia, which, according to one study, had the fastest me-
dian time-to-trial for patent cases from 1995 to 2008 (0.88 years), does not have any local patent
rules. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 53, at 17. See generally E.D. VA. LOCAL R.,
available at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/localrules/EDVALRMay2009.pdf.
349 See, e.g., Integrated Circuit Sys., Inc. v. Realtek Semiconductor Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1106,
1107 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("The purpose of the Patent Local Rules is to place the parties on an or-
derly pretrial track which will produce a ruling on claim construction approximately a year after
the complaint is filed.").
350 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 5, at 146.
351 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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event, the dramatic increase in costly patent infringement litigation is only contrib-
uting to the problem. If anything, this litigation demonstrates that action must be
taken to mitigate its drastic and perilous consequences on innovation and the patent
system as a whole.
Altering pleading standards will not remedy all that ails the modem patent
system, or even all that ails patent infringement litigation. It does, however, present
a mechanism for curbing litigation abuse and reining in troll-like behavior. Unlike
other potential mechanisms, particularized patent pleading provides a quick, eco-
nomically efficient method for alleged infringers to contest nuisance-value claims
and begin the process of putting the patent system back on track to truly promoting
progress in science and the useful arts.
